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In this thesis how labour markets are a￿ected by globalisation is examined. The thesis takes the
form of three chapters. The ￿rst chapter looks at the state of trade unions in Europe and how they
have been a￿ected by globalisation; the second chapter is theoretical in nature and shows how the
increasing size of trade blocs and lower transport costs can help to explain the decline in trade union
density; and the third chapter looks at how the ability of ￿rms to locate production in more than one
country can a￿ect wages and unemployment.
The ￿rst chapter describes trends related to trade unions in Europe, before examining how glob-
alisation can a￿ect trade unions and how trade unions may respond. Since the 1980s there has been a
general decline in trade union density and strike activity. At the same time there has been an increase
in globalisation. Although common explanations have been put forward for the decline of trade union
density across European countries, no cointegration has been found between trends in trade union
density. Despite declines in trade union density, unions have continued to be successful in gaining
wage premia for their members. The increase in globalisation has been associated with an increase
in the elasticity of demand for labour. This a￿ects the employment/wage trade o￿ faced by trade
unions. There is also some evidence that multinationals can use their cross-border bargaining power
to reduce wages. Unions have reacted to globalisation by cooperating internationally, but any progress
towards cross border collective bargaining has been at best slow. A simple model is presented in the
chapter in order to anticipate the issues discussed in chapters two and three. The model suggests that
unions will be more likely to cooperate internationally if they are substitutes in production and if the
reservation wage is low.
The second chapter looks at how multinational enterprises (MNEs) can a￿ect wages and unem-
ployment. While the increase in international ￿rm mobility has been well documented, its e￿ects on
macroeconomic aggregates and in the labour market are still controversial. MNEs bene￿t from an
international outside option during wage bargaining, leading to a decrease in average wages. How-
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DOI: 10.2870/15663ever, a strategic incentive to hire extra workers in a foreign (home) plant in order to reduce wages in
the home (foreign) plant has an indirect positive e￿ect on wages due to spillovers resulting from an
increased demand for labour. In a framework of frictional unemployment, permitting MNEs leads to
a decrease in unemployment. Abstracting from transport and plant ￿xed costs, MNEs lead to higher
wages. However, including transport and plant costs generally leads to lower wages, though the e￿ects
are small. The strategic hiring e￿ect is important in mitigating the fall in wages.
Finally, in the third chapter a model is presented which shows how increased product market
competition due to an increase in the size of trade blocs and a lower cost of transporting goods
internationally can lead to a decline in trade union density. Increasing international product market
competition harms unionised workers more than workers who bargain wages individually. This is as
union wages are a function of average revenue but individually bargained wages are a function of
marginal revenue. Increasing competition narrows the gap between average and marginal revenue.
This lowers the incentive to be a member of a trade union, which leads to a fall in trade union density.
Globalisation can lead to falling union density despite a stable union wage premium and increasing
union wages.
iv
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The State of Trade Unions in Europe
1.1 Introduction
Since the late 1970s trade union density and strike days have declined. In 1979 almost half of
Italian workers were members of trade unions, and each worker spent an average of two working days
on strike. By 2006, Italian trade union density was down to a third of the workforce and they spent
an average of 14 minutes on strike. Even for countries using the Ghent system, whereby trade unions
pay or administer unemployment insurance, though there has not been a large decrease in union
membership there has been a large decrease in strike activity. Throughout Europe the face of trade
unionism has changed. Strikes are less frequent, bargaining tends to be less centralised, and trade
union density has decreased. In this paper I will outline some of the recent changes a￿ecting European
trade unions. In section two trends in EU trade union density, coverage, and strike activity, as well as
the degree of centralisation of union bargaining, are outlined. In the third section how globalisation
a￿ects unions is outlined and in section four the institutional response of unions is described. In
section ￿ve a simple model is presented in order to anticipate the isssues discussed in chapters two
and three of this thesis. Section six concludes.
1.2 Recent trends in trade union strength
Across the majority of countries in Europe there has been a decline in trade union density, though
the decline appears to have stabilised. The major division in European industrial relations systems
is between countries that use the Ghent system, whereby unemployment bene￿ts are administered
by trade unions, and those that do not. This di￿erence in industrial relations systems is of major
1
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importance in explaining the di￿ering trends of trade union density in Europe.
Figure 1.1: Trade union density for selected EU countries not using the Ghent system, 1960-2006:
Source ICTWSS database
Figure 1.2: Trade union density for EU countries using the Ghent system, 1960-2006: Source ICTWSS
database
Figure 1.1 shows the pattern of union density for seven EU countries that do not use the Ghent
system. For Italy, Ireland and the UK trade union density increased until 1980 and then declined.
These three countries share a voluntarist system (Waddington and Ho￿man, 2000) whereby the state
plays a relatively small role and does not extend agreements to those that do not participate in
negotiations. In Ireland trade union membership has actually increased, though not at the same pace
as employment. It has been suggested that the pre-1979 rise in union density in the UK was largely
2
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Figure 1.3: Trade union density for Norway and Switzerland, 1960-2006: Source ICTWSS database
due to the unionisation of the public sector (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000). Austria has shown a
steady decline in union density since 1960, while both France and Netherlands have shown stable
union density until approximately 1980 and then a steady decline. For Germany the decline did not
start until the mid-1980s followed by a short term increase in union density due to reuni￿cation.
Though the decline in density has been remarked upon before, using up to date data shows that with
the exception of Ireland and Austria trade union density is stabilising.
A di￿erent pattern emerges with regard to countries using the Ghent system. Trade union
bargaining can be viewed as a public good for covered workers. This is as collective agreements
usually apply to all workers in the bargaining unit, regardless of whether they belong to a union, and
in some countries collective agreements can be extended beyond ￿rms that are engaged in bargaining.
This means that many workers may free ride and not pay union dues or other costs such as attending
meetings. The Ghent system provides a selective incentive, in the form of unemployment insurance,
to trade union members, and this helps to explain the higher trade union density in countries that
use the Ghent system. As can be seen in Figure 1.2, Finland’s sharp increase in union density during
the late 1960s and early 1970s can be explained by the adoption of the Ghent system during this
time (Waddington and Ho￿man, 2000). Both Finland and Sweden show a peak in union density in
1994, and a slight decline afterwards which has since stabilised. This decline coincides with both
membership of the EU in 1995, and a reduction in unemployment following recessions in the early
1990s. Lower unemployment can reduce the selective incentive to be a trade union member as the
attractiveness of unemployment insurance is reduced. In Belgium trade unions administer rather than
fund unemployment insurance. This helps to explain the lower level of Belgian trade union density.
3
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Denmark’s pattern of union density di￿ers from the other Ghent countries in that it increases until
about 1980 and shows a moderate decrease afterwards. Similar to Italy, Ireland, and the UK, Denmark
has a voluntarist industrial relations system (Waddington and Ho￿man, 2000) and Denmark shows a
similar hump-shaped pattern of union density with a peak around 1980, though the post 1980 decline
in union density is less severe. Denmark also joined the EU at the same time as Ireland and the
UK. Figure 1.3 shows union density for two non-EU countries. Norwegian union density has been
remarkable stable and at a high level. This is despite Norway not using the Ghent system and the
reason of the high level of density is something of a puzzle. Switzerland’s decline in density has been
similar to that of Austria, with the exception of a rise in density in the late 1970s.
Many explanations have been put forward for the decline in union density, such as increased
numbers of women in the workforce, a shift away from manufacturing, increased competition and
institutional changes. With the exception of institutional changes these changes should be common
to European countries. However, using data from 14 European countries Checchi and Lucifora (2002)
say that there is no generalised downward trend in European trade union density. Blaschke (2000)
states that union density has increased in the Ghent countries but that controlling for the Ghent
system there was no European pattern in unionisation, though trade has had a small negative e￿ect.
Focusing on patterns in trade union density across the OECD rather than EU, Blanch￿ower (2007)
￿nds a general decline in trade union density since 1970. Using UK data, Konings and Walsh (2000)
￿nd that employment loss due to increased competition is higher in non-unionised ￿rms than in
unionised ￿rms. This is as increased competition reduces union rents, reducing the incentive for ￿rms
to ￿re workers. The e￿ect of this would be to increase union density in the short-run. Preugschat
(2008) models how when it is costly for a union to organise a workplace, an increase in ￿rm entry
and exit can lead to lower trade union density. Disney et al. (1995) and Machin (2000) ￿nd that the
main reason for the decline of British trade unionism is a failure to organise in new establishments,
evidence which supports the model of Preugschat (2008). Acemoglu et al. (2001) put forward a
model in which deunionisation is caused by skill biased technical change. As the outside option for
skilled workers improves due to technical change they have less incentive to remain in a union with
unskilled workers. Looking at data from 1950 to 1995, Ebbinghaus and Visser (1999) note that union
density had increased with the increase in large industrial conglomerates, institutionalised collective
employment relations and the increase in social citizenship rights. These processes reversed at the
same time as unions declined. However, Disney et al. (1995) note that for Britain many of the
compositional shifts, such as expansion of the service sector and increased female participation in
the labour force, occurred during the 1970s before union density peaked and density also declined in
4
O’Farrell, Rory (2010), Globalisation and Labour Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/15663Chapter 1. The State of Trade Unions in Europe
sectors where unions have traditionally found it easier to organise.
Table 1.1: Cointegration test of trade union density for 13 European Countries The countries included are
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, using trade union
density for 1960-2006 from the ICTWSS database.
Test Deterministic terms No. of lagged di￿erences H0 : r = r0 Test statistic P value
Saikkonen & L￿tkepohl test Constant 2 r0 = 11 16.43 0.0086
r0 = 12 3.52 0.0720
Constant and Trend 2 r0 = 8 74.18 0.0083
r0 = 9 45.19 0.0515
Orthogonal trend 2 r0 = 11 15.65 0.0037
Johansen Trace test Constant 2 r0 = 11 26.91 0.0042
r0 = 12 10.67 0.0245
Constant and Trend 2 r0 = 11 26.40 0.0407
r0 = 12 10.21 0.1194
Orthogonal trend 2 r0 = 9 52.13 0.0173
r0 = 10 27.33 0.0957
r0 = 11 10.95 0.2182
Despite common downward trends in trade union density, Table 1.1 to 1.3 show no evidence
of cointegration between countries. I ￿rst test for the 13 European countries for which trade union
density data from 1960 to 2006, is available, and then I repeat the exercise dividing the sample into
Ghent countries and non-Ghent countries. Cointegration rank tests for higher dimensional systems
(such as those presented) tend to have low power (L￿tkepohl and Kratzig, 2004). This means that
the results of Table 1.1 are more likely to show cointegration, when in fact none is present, than Table
1.2 or Table 1.3. In view of this, any evidence in favour of cointegration is very weak. From Table
1.1, looking where constant and trend deterministic term are assumed, the Saikkonen and L￿tkepohl
test shows evidence of cointegration as it shows there are nine cointegrating relations in a system of
13 variables and a trend. However, the Johansen Trace test does not support this. For none of the
models do both the Johansen Trace test and the Saikkonen and L￿tkepohl test indicate cointegration.
Therefore it can be concluded that there is no-cointegration of trade union density in Europe. This
is something of a puzzle as trade unions across Europe have been a￿ected by similar trends such as
changes in technology and increasing globalisation. However, the absence of cointegration maybe due
to trade unions across countries having di￿erent characteristics and reacting di￿erently to changes.
5
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Table 1.2: Cointegration test of trade union density for the four Ghent countries The countries included are
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, using trade union density from 1960-2006 from the ICTWSS database.
Test Deterministic terms No. of lagged di￿erences H0 : r = r0 Test statistic P value
Saikkonen & L￿tkepohl test Constant 8 r0 = 2 20.25 0.0015
r0 = 3 1.64 0.2342
Constant and trend 8 r0 = 3 12.47 0.0021
Orthogonal trend 8 r0 = 2 43.78 0.0000
Johansen Trace test Constant 8 r0 = 2 49.29 0.0000
r0 = 3 12.18 0.0118
Constant and trend 8 r0 = 3 19.44 0.0023
Orthogonal trend 8 r0 = 2 40.01 0.0000
In order to explain the trends in density there has been some research on why people join unions.
There have been several theories on why people join unions including the utilitarian motive theory and
the social customs theory. Using data for European countries, Visser (2002) ￿nds evidence supporting
the social custom theory. The social custom theory suggests that people join unions due to peer
pressure among other reasons, and that this pressure has decreased. Using UK data, Charlwood
(2002) examines why non-union workers wish to join trade unions. Forty per cent of British non-union
workers wish to join a trade union (50 per cent for manual workers and 33 per cent for non-manual
workers). Job dissatisfaction and believing that their pay is low are insigni￿cant motives for joining
a union for the whole sample, but these motives are signi￿cant for non-manual workers. A very
strong relationship between the perceived instrumentality of unions and willingness to join was found.
Those with left-wing views, former union members and those from the traditional geographic areas
of mining, manufacturing and industry are more likely to join. Using West German micro data from
1980 to 2000, Schnabel and Wagner (2005) ￿nd evidence that casts doubt on the social custom theory
of union membership. As non-union members of a union also bene￿t from collective agreements,
the social custom motive has been put forward as a solution to the free rider problem. The authors
suggest that as the government provides services that had been provided by unions this reduces the
selective incentive of union membership and makes it more di￿cult for unions to attract members.
They describe as a stylised fact that men are more likely to be union members and explain this by
their greater attachment to the labour market. The data suggests that personal, occupational and
6
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Table 1.3: Cointegration test of trade union density for nine non-Ghent European countries The countries
are Austria, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the UK, using trade union density from 1960-2006 from the
ICTWSS database.
Test Deterministic terms No. of lagged di￿erences H0 : r = r0 Test statistic P value
Saikkonen & L￿tkepohl test Constant 3 r0 = 7 17.94 0.0044
r0 = 8 0.25 0.6784
Constant and trend 3 r0 = 6 32.02 0.0165
r0 = 7 10.78 0.2723
Orthogonal trend 3 r0 = 7 17.94 0.0013
Johansen Trace test Constant 3 r0 = 7 32.75 0.0004
r0 = 8 14.96 0.0030
Constant and trend 3 r0 = 7 32.10 0.0060
r0 = 8 13.23 0.0363
Orthogonal trend 3 r0 = 7 18.08 0.0184
attitudinal variables such as gender, occupational status, ￿rm size and political orientation play a role
in the unionisation process, a ￿nding consistent with Charlwood (2002). Gender and occupational
characteristics are the most robust over time. Using data from several countries, Blanch￿ower (2007)
￿nds an inverted U shape age pro￿le of union membership with people in their late 40s most likely
to be union members. This was found to be robust across countries. Public sector workers are also
more likely to be unionised. Using UK data they also ￿nd that men are more likely to be members,
the more educated in the public sector are more likely to be union members, but the more educated
in the private sector are less likely to be members, full time workers are more likely to be members
than part-time workers and middle aged workers are most likely to be members. Apart from the
inverted U-shape age pro￿le results were mixed for the other European countries, perhaps due to
smaller sample sizes. Schnabel and Wagner (2007) also perform a multi-country analysis using data
from 18 EU countries. They note the large variation in union density across countries and ￿nd that
the individual characteristics of workers and ￿rms play a major role in determining union membership
with social factors playing a minor role. In contrast to Blanch￿ower (2007) and Charlwood (2002),
which both used UK data, a left-wing political orientation and dissatisfaction at how things are done
at work were signi￿cant in determining union membership in only a few countries, though these were
signi￿cant for the UK in their study. They ￿nd that the presence of a union in a workplace and
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workers attitudes concerning strong unions are the main determinants of membership and no evidence
was found that blue collar workers are the backbone of membership. With larger monetary and non-
monetary bene￿ts workers are more likely to join a union. The inverted U shape of Blanch￿ower (2007)
was not found, possibly due to more control variables being used. The Ghent System was found to be
important in increasing union density. Rather than using survey data from one country, Checchi and
Lucifora (2002) look at union density across 14 European countries. They ￿nd that institutions such
as minimum wages, job security legislation and wage indexation crowd out unions. However, in￿ation
and institutions which lower the cost of organising help to increase union membership.
Figure 1.4: Trade union coverage for selected EU countries not using the Ghent system, 1960-2006:
Source ICTWSS database
Though there has been a decline for non-Ghent countries in union density, a di￿erent picture
emerges in terms of union coverage, which depends very much on national institutions. In a report
from the European Commission (2009) it is found that the percentage of workers in ￿rms that are part
of employer federations (employer density), rather than trade union density, explains union coverage.
It must be noted that data available are less reliable than for union density. Looking at Figure 1.4,
for Austria union density has remained stable, with a slight increase. France and the Netherlands
show stable union coverage until the late 1970s and then a steady increase. Interestingly this coincides
with the pattern of stable union density until the late 1970s and then a steady decline. The legal
extension of collective agreements to non-unionised ￿rms could perhaps have reduced the incentive of
trade unions to recruit new members. However, the declines in coverage for the UK and Germany
are in line with declines in union density. Italian coverage shows a steady decline despite the hump
shaped trend in union density.
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Figure 1.5: Trade union coverage for EU countries using the Ghent system, 1960-2006: Source
ICTWSS database
Figure 1.6: Trade union coverage for Norway and Switzerland, 1960-2006: Source ICTWSS database
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For the Ghent countries it can be seen in Figure 1.5 that coverage has moved broadly in line with
changes in union density, though Belgium has the highest level of coverage, and the lowest density of
the Ghent countries. Figure 1.6 shows that Norwegian coverage is stable, as is its union density, and
that Switzerland shows a stable pattern of coverage, despite the steady decline in union density.
Figure 1.7: Average trade union coverage and density for European countries, 1960-73: Source
ICTWSS database
Figure 1.8: Average trade union coverage and density for European countries, 1974-87: Source
ICTWSS database
Figures 1.7 to 1.10 show a divergence in patterns of trade union membership and coverage for
eleven European countries. Union coverage is plotted against union density. For countries on the 45
degree line there is a one to one relationship between coverage and density, while the further above
the 45 degree line a country is the greater the degree of free riding. As is expected, the countries
with the greatest state involvement in industrial relations are farthest from the 45 degree line. This
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Figure 1.9: Average trade union coverage and density for European countries, 1988-95: Source
ICTWSS database
Figure 1.10: Average trade union coverage and density for European countries, 1996-2006: Source
ICTWSS database
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is as the state provides services that are a substitute for union services (Schnabel and Wagner, 2005).
Prior to 1974 most countries were clustered in an area of union density of between 40 and 55 percent
and union coverage of between 60 and 80 percent. However there is a clear pattern of dispersal that
can be seen from the graphs. This is due to a decline in union density in some countries and changes
in the institutional framework. As can be seen, Sweden and Denmark are close to the 45 degree
line. This is as the Ghent system provides selective incentives to join a union and there is little
compulsory extension of union agreements to non-union ￿rms. Comparing Figure 1.7 to Figure 1.8
there is decrease in free riding for Finland as it adopted the Ghent system in the late 1960s. The
UK has moved closer to the 45 degree line. One explanation for the decline of British union density
has been the end of the closed shop system. This system made union membership compulsory for
all workers in a ￿rm and helped to prevent free riding. Simultaneously, Wages Councils were also
abolished (Waddington and Ho￿man, 2000). As Figure 1.11 shows there has been a steady decline in
free riding, suggesting that UK unions have been successful in recruiting covered workers into unions,
despite the end of closed shops.
Figure 1.11: Ratio of union coverage to union density for the UK, 1960-2006: Source ICTWSS database
There has also been a reduction in the number of days lost due to strike action. This decline
has been most pronounced after 1980, but as there is a wave pattern to strike activity it is di￿cult
to establish trends. Strike pay is also a selective incentive (Schnabel and Wagner, 2007) so if workers
feel that they are less likely to be involved in strike action then strike pay will be less of a selective
incentive. Also, if there are less workers in a trade union, the union may be less willing to call a strike
as they do not expect it to be successful. There is a huge variation across countries in the number
of days lost to strike action, making graphical representation di￿cult. Presented are graphs of strike
days per 1,000 unionised workers. Controlling for the number of unionised workers in this way helps
to smooth out some of the heterogeneity, but there are still large di￿erences between countries, and
even between those with similar industrial relations systems.
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Strike activity across the Ghent countries shows a general decrease since 1971. However, as seen
in Figure 1.12 and Figure 1.13, though there are similar levels of strike days for Denmark and Finland,
and also for Belgium and Sweden (with the exception of a spike in strike activity in 1980), Denmark
and Finland show far higher levels of strike activity than Sweden, despite having similar industrial
relations systems. Why this is so poses something of a puzzle, and may be due to state intervention.
In addition to Denmark and Finland, as seen in Figure 1.14 voluntarist Italy, Ireland and the UK
show a high level of days lost to strike action, though there has been a steady decrease.
There is a consistent wave pattern to the number of strike days, as can be seen clearly for France
in Figure 1.15, and why this is the case could be an interesting area of research. Piazza (2005) suggests
a link between the decreased number of strike days and increased globalisation and that the degree
to which bargaining is centralised is negatively associated with strikes. However, Sweden and the UK
show a lower level in the time since bargaining has become more decentralised.
1.2.1 Has the trade union wage premium been maintained?
A measure of the strength of unions is if they can gain wage premia for those they represent.
With the exception of Britain, there has been relatively little research conducted on the trade union
wage premium in Europe. Blanch￿ower and Bryson (2002) ￿nd that the wage gap in the UK is pro-
cyclical, which is consistent for evidence from the US (Bratsberg and Ragan, 2002; Blanch￿ower and
Bryson, 2004) while Kaufman (2002) ￿nds that UK wage premia have been stable over the long term.
Blanch￿ower and Bryson (2002) estimate the trade union wage premium for 19 countries, including
12 European countries using data from 1994 to 1999. The results are presented in Table 1.4. There
is no clear pattern to the data. Denmark has a signi￿cant wage premium, while Sweden does not,
despite having similar labour institutions. The insigni￿cant wage premium for some countries may be
due to non-union workers being covered by union agreements. As union wage agreements tend to be
extended to non-members a distinction should be made between the union membership premium and
the premium associated with being covered by union agreements. Using data for the Italian metal-
mechanical industry Dell ’Aringa and Lucifora (1994) ￿nd a 4.4 per cent premium for blue collar
workers and a 7.7 per cent premium for white collar workers who are covered by ￿rm level collective
bargaining agreements. Using 1995 data for Spain, Card and De la Rica (2006) estimate the ￿rm level
collective agreement premium to be between ￿ve and 10 percent, with higher premia for the more
highly paid workers. Using 1995 to 2000 data, Braun and Sche￿el (2007) ￿nd that in Germany those
covered by a collective industry agreement enjoy a premium of 6.1 per cent while those covered by a
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Figure 1.12: Strike days per unionised worker for Denmark and Finland, 1971-2006: Source ICTWSS
database and ILO LABORSTA database
Figure 1.13: Strike days per unionised worker for Belgium and Sweden, 1971-2006: Source ICTWSS
database and ILO LABORSTA database
Figure 1.14: Strike days per unionised worker for Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom, 1971-2006:
Source ICTWSS database and ILO LABORSTA database
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Figure 1.15: Strike days per unionised worker for France and Norway, 1971-2006: Source ICTWSS
database and ILO LABORSTA database
￿rm agreement gain a premium of 5.7 per cent. Braun (2008) ￿nds that Danish workers got a wage
premium of 11.85 per cent from 1999 to 2002. Using 1995 data for Belgium, Denmark and Spain,
Plasman et al. (2006) ￿nd that single employer bargaining raises wages by about four percent with
respect to multi-employer bargaining. These higher estimates for the collective bargaining premium
is consistent with evidence for Australia (Wooden, 2001), suggesting that the ￿gures of Blanch￿ower
and Bryson (2002) underestimate the collective bargaining premium in some cases. Because of the
lack of comparable European studies it is not possible to draw conclusions of the evolution of the
European trade union premium over time. However, despite declines in union density and numbers of
strikes, it appears that European trade unions are still able to negotiate wage premia for those they
represent.
Table 1.4: Results of Blanch￿ower and Bryson (2002)
European Countries Non-European Countries
Austria 15% Australia 11.8%
Cyprus 13.7% Canada 8.3%
Denmark 15.9% Chile 15.9%
France Insigni￿cant New Zealand 9.9%
Germany Insigni￿cant Japan 15.9%






UK 14.2% in 1993 to 6.3% in 2000
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1.2.2 Patterns in centralisation
With the exception of the UK, the degree of wage coordination separates European trade unions
from those of other regions. Using ICTWSS coordination scores for 2007, only the UK had the lowest
coordination score of one, representing fragmented bargaining mainly at company level. It shared this
score with the US and Canada. Though France and Luxembourg also had low coordination, with
a score of two representing a mixture of ￿rm and industry level bargaining with weak enforceabil-
ity. Though in the past several countries had the highest degree of coordination, where there was
economy wide bargaining with enforceable agreements between central bargaining umbrella groups,
now only Ireland ￿ts this description. The majority of countries have an intermediate level of wage
coordination, with industry wide bargaining, or a mixture of economy wide and industry bargaining
with central organisations negotiating unenforceable guidelines. However, there is no clear pattern
as to what causes the degree of centralisation, with no patterns for Ghent/non-Ghent, EU/non-EU,
or Eurozone/non-Eurozone countries. Van Gyes (2007) suggest that there has been a decrease in the
centralisation of union bargaining in Europe. Marginson and Sisson (2002) suggest that European
bargaining is moving neither towards more centralised bargaining nor American style bargaining, but
that there has been a convergence of bargaining systems in internationally exposed areas such as car
manufacture. Nickel et al. (2005) make a distinction between the centralisation of wage bargaining
and the degree of coordination (whereby the aggregate employment implications of wage determina-
tion are taken into account when wage bargains are struck). Dri￿l (2006) points to the decrease in the
centralisation of wage bargaining, with Ortigueira (2006) suggesting that skill biased technical change
reduces the willingness of skilled workers to bargain alongside unskilled workers. This is due to the
tendency of centralised bargaining to compress wages. Overtime the degree of coordination tends to
be volatile as negotiations break down and bargaining is conducted at a lower level, or occasionally
the government intervenes and imposes a wage schedule. Only Ireland and Italy have had a general
increase in coordination since 1960.
The non-monotonic relationship between the centralisation of wage bargaining and unemploy-
ment was proposed by Calmfors and Dri￿l (1998). A review of the topic is given by Dri￿l (2006).
Iversen (1999) suggests that where there is an intermediate level of centralisation of wage bargaining
then a non-accommodating monetary policy should be followed, but when wage bargaining is highly
centralised then monetary policy should be accommodating. This is as with centralised bargaining
there tends to be wage compression during negotiations and then wage drift after. In contrast to
Nordic countries Austria showed low in￿ation, low unemployment but also higher inequality as wage
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bargaining at the top level negotiated the overall increase, while at a lower level how this increase
is distributed was negotiated. They propose that where wage bargaining is centralised unions will
internalise the e￿ect of higher wages on the demand for labour and will therefore moderate their wage
demands, leading to lower unemployment. Dri￿l (2006) ￿nds that the non-monotonic relationship
between the coordination of union bargaining and unemployment has not been entirely overturned, the
empirical relevance is questionable. Calmfors (2001) tries to predict the e￿ect of European Monetary
Union (EMU) on bargaining structures. Due to EMU wages will need to be more ￿exible as monetary
policy can no longer be used. As national level bargaining tends to be more ￿exible, EMU could lead
to the increase in the centralisation of bargaining. However, those bargaining at the national level
will no longer internalise the reactions of the central bank, as it will no longer be a national central
bank. Overall, Calmfors (2001) considers that EMU will probably promote the national coordination
of wage bargaining.
It has been suggested that wage centralisation a￿ects both wage compression and aggregate
unemployment. Using 1986 and 1992 data for Portugal, Hartog, Pereira and Vieira (2002) ￿nd that
single ￿rm bargaining consistently gave the smallest blue collar/white collar wage gap. However, using
European Structure of Earnings Survey data from 1995 for Italy, Belgium and Spain, Dell ’Aringa and
Pagani (2007) ￿nd that the wages of workers covered by just multi-employer contracts are no more
compressed than the wages of those covered by both multi-employer and single-employer contracts
in Italy and Belgium. This suggests that employers unilaterally pay wage supplements to those not
covered by single employer contracts and that the wage compression due to union agreements that is
found in other regions was not found in Europe. Using Italian data, Checchi and Pagani (2005) ￿nd
that local bargaining reduces inequality. For Spain the results were mixed. Using the same data set
for Spain, Card and de la Rica (2006) ￿nd that with local bargaining wages are less compressed than
with centralised bargaining. Dom￿nguez and GutiØrrez (2004) account for selection bias regarding
which workers will seek ￿rm level agreements and ￿nd that in Spain collective agreements at ￿rm
level reduce wage dispersion, though due to ￿rm and worker characteristics ￿rms that have signed
such agreements have higher dispersion. For the Netherlands, Hartog, Leuven, and Teulings (2002)
￿nd that ￿rm level bargaining leads to a two percent higher return to each year of education than
industry level bargaining, ￿rms covered by mandatory extension of industry agreements, or ￿rms not
covered by any collective agreement. Using 1998 and 1999 data for Portugal, Cardoso and Portugal
(2005) ￿nd a di￿erence between the collectively bargained contractual wage and the actual wage.
This "wage cushion" was found to have a de-equalising e￿ect, increasing the returns to education
and tenure. Again using the European Structure of Earnings Survey data from 1995, but for the
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manufacturing sector in Belgium, Denmark and Spain, Plasman et al. (2006) ￿nd that single employer
bargaining raises wage dispersion in Belgium and Denmark, but reduces it in Spain. They suggest that
in countries with more centralised bargaining systems single employer bargaining serves to increase
wage di￿erences, but countries with a less centralised, "Anglo Saxon" style bargaining system single
employer bargaining serves to compress wages. This is as in a centralised environment minimum
industry wages are set at a national or industry level, so during wage bargaining the outside option
is the industry level agreement. Given the inconsistency of results for Spain, the evidence for the
hypothesis of Plasman et al. (2006) is at best mixed.
Apart from compression e￿ects, the level at which bargaining occurs can a￿ect the level of wages.
Obviously where industry or national agreements set out minimum wage rates for an industry then
single employer bargaining will only serve to increase wages. In Portugal multi-￿rm agreements
consistently gave the highest premium for blue and white collar workers (Hartog, Pereira and Vieira,
2002) while in the Netherlands there was no signi￿cant di￿erence between the wage premium of being
included in a ￿rm level or industry level collective bargain (Hartog, Leuven, and Teulings, 2002). Both
forms of bargaining gave a premium of about 4.1 per cent above the wages of those covered by either
no collective agreement or the mandatory extension of industry agreements. There was no signi￿cant
di￿erence between being covered by mandatory extension and not being covered by any collective
agreement. Granqvist and RegnØr (2008) ￿nd that in Sweden that those who collectively take part
in pay review or individual bargaining, with the agreement of their union, gain signi￿cantly higher
wages than those who do not. However there is a selection bias as only those who expect to receive
higher wages are likely to engage in bargaining.
1.3 Globalisation
It is a stylised fact that there has been an increase in trade and international investment since 1980.
There has been a increase in economic globalisation, with economic integration being particularly close
among EU states. Pavelin and Barry (2005) found a substantial increase in the geographical dispersion
of multinational enterprise (MNE) production plants in the EU between 1987 and 1993. It is to be
expected that globalisation has had an a￿ect on unions in Europe. Piazza (2005) suggests a link
between increased globalisation and a decreasing number of strike days, though the link could be
simply coincidental. Both the e￿ect of labour market institutions on FDI, and the e￿ect of FDI on
unions have been examined. Although market size is the most important determinant of where MNEs
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locate, labour market institutions have a signi￿cant impact on where ￿rms locate (Bognanno et al.,
2005). Cooke (1997) ￿nds that unionisation discourages US ￿rms from investing in a country, though
US FDI is positively associated with countries with work councils. However, Cooke and Noble (1998)
￿nd that a country’s skill base and level of education is the most important factor in determining US
FDI, and is more important than union status.
That MNEs pay higher wages has been described as a stylised fact (Girma and Gorg, 2007).
Aitken, et al., (1996) ￿nd that in Mexico and Venezuela foreign ￿rms pay higher wages. However, when
controlling for ￿rm and worker speci￿c characteristics this foreign wage premium disappears. Girma
et al., (2002) ￿nd that in the UK foreign ￿rms are 8-15 per cent more productive than domestic ￿rms,
and the main reason foreign ￿rms are more productive is due to technology (Girma and Gorg, 2007).
Conyon et al. (2002) ￿nd that domestic mergers cause a decrease in wages but foreign acquisition
leads to higher wages due to productivity changes. Girma and Gorg (2007a) ￿nd that UK ￿rms taken
over by US ￿rms pay higher wages but ￿rms acquired by EU ￿rms do not, possibly due to a greater
technology gap with the US than EU. Controlling for ￿rm and individual e￿ects, though not union
status, Heyman et al. (2007) use Portuguese data and ￿nd no evidence that foreign ￿rms pay identical
workers higher wages. Also using Portuguese data, Almeida (2007) studies the acquisition of ￿rms
and ￿nds that it is not foreign ownership, but multinational status that is important in explaining the
foreign ownership wage premium. Wages in plants tend to rise when taken over by a MNE.
Hijzen et al. (2005) use UK data to show that international outsourcing reduces the demand for
unskilled labour. Konings and Murphy (2006) look at MNEs that already have plants in more than
one country and ask whether changes in wages cause the ￿rm to relocate jobs between plants. They
￿nd that changes in wages in Northern European plants have a small e￿ect on employment and no
e￿ect was found for changes in wages for Central European countries. Using Swedish data Braconier
and Ekholm (2000) ￿nd that workers in high income countries employed in a￿liates of Swedish MNEs
are substitutes for workers in the parent ￿rm, though workers in a￿liates in di￿erent countries are
compliments. Becker et al. (2005) use both Swedish and German data. They ￿nd that in MNEs from
either country, a￿liate employment tends to substitute for employment at the parent ￿rm. Braun
and Sche￿el (2007) look at the e￿ect of outsourcing on the trade union wage premium. Using German
data they ￿nd the wage premium associated with collective agreements at the industry and ￿rm level
are reduced for low skilled workers. Though the wages of medium skilled workers remained stable,
the wages of high skilled workers increased, though there was no interaction between union coverage
and the increased wages. Using Danish data Braun (2008) shows that in MNEs the normal union
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wage premium disappears. This is consistent with the theory that MNEs have an advantage in wage
bargaining when it has plants in more than one country that are substitutes. Though most of the
theoretical literature focuses on how globalisation a￿ects the outside option of unions during wage
bargaining, using data from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK, Dumont et al. (2006) ￿nd
that globalisation reduces workers bargaining power and suggest that greater labour market tightness
increases bargaining power. However they neglect the role of changes in the outside option. In contrast
Brock and Debbelaere (2006) use Belgian data and ￿nd that trade has had no e￿ect on the bargaining
power parameter of workers, though technical change improves the bargaining power of workers.
It has been suggested that an increase in the price elasticity of demand for labour reduces the
bargaining power of labour as there is a greater wage/employment trade o￿. There are two main e￿ects
through which globalisation can a￿ect the price elasticity of demand for labour. There is a scale e￿ect
which is due to greater product market competition. This product market competition increases the
price elasticity of demand for output, and as labour is a derived demand it a￿ects the price elasticity
of demand for labour. There is also a substitute e￿ect as ￿rms can choose di￿erent inputs. In line
with studies for other regions (e.g. Slaughter, 2001 for the US; and Haouas and Yagoubi, 2004 for
Tunisia) there is at best mixed support for the idea that globalisation has increased the price elasticity
of demand for labour in Europe. Crino (2009) states that in studies using industry level data little
or no evidence is found in support of globalisation increasing the elasticity of labour demand, but
research using ￿rm level data does support it. Using UK and German data Hatzius (2000) looks
at how FDI a￿ects factor demand elasticities. He ￿nds that a one per cent increase in unit labour
costs causes a decrease in the manufacturing stock of 1.7 per cent. The e￿ect of labour costs on
domestic manufacturing investment was more negative during the 1980s when FDI was relatively
high than in the 1970s when FDI was low with the change concentrated in the relatively high FDI
industries. This suggests that the long run labour demand elasticity may have risen. Jean (2000)
￿nds some evidence that trade has increased the price elasticity of demand for labour in France while
Riihimaki (2005) ￿nds more relative growth in elasticities for skilled labour than unskilled. Krishna
et al. (2001) ￿nd no link between trade and labour demand elasticities in Turkey, while Fabbri et
al. (2003) ￿nd that elasticity for UK low skilled labour has increased, a ￿nding which contrasts with
Riihimaki (2005). Bruno et al. (2004) focus on the substitute e￿ect on the price elasticity of demand
for labour. Using data from 1970 to 1996 for France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the UK and the US
they only ￿nd a signi￿cant substitution e￿ect for the UK, with mixed results for Italy and France.
Using data from eleven European countries, Navaretti et al. (2003) ￿nd that MNEs show smaller
elasticities than national ￿rms. The elasticities for MNEs has little variation across countries with
20
O’Farrell, Rory (2010), Globalisation and Labour Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/15663Chapter 1. The State of Trade Unions in Europe
the ratio of national ￿rm elasticities to MNE elasticities is positively correlated with indices of labour
market regulation, suggesting that MNEs can sidestep regulations. They also ￿nd that employment
adjustment in MNE a￿liates is signi￿cantly faster than for national ￿rms. Overall any evidence in
support of globalisation a￿ecting elasticities is at best weak.
1.4 International trade union cooperation
Multinationals have been described as
￿pushing down wages and conditions for workers the world over by playing one national
workforce o￿ against another." 1
However, at best, transnational collective bargaining is underdeveloped in Europe. Even in Ireland,
where the majority of union members are in unions organised on an all-Ireland basis, and where there
is one peak union organisation for the whole country, unions bargain wages separately with ￿rms in the
jurisdictions of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. However, there have been cross-border
negotiations regarding non-pay issues 2. There have however also been some advances in recent years
with regard to cooperation between unions in Europe.
International trade union cooperation takes two main forms, bilateral cooperation and partic-
ipation in federations. Most European trade unions are simultaneously members of four di￿erent
federations. There are the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), and the European Trade
Union Confederation (ETUC). These exist to represent unions covering all sector and skill levels at the
international and European level. The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) was formed
in November 2006. In practice, the ITUC has a strong focus on promoting union rights in developing
countries and acts almost as a human rights organisation for trade unionists. The ETUC was founded
in 1973 and covers trade unions both within and outside the European Union. A large part of its work
is lobbying European Union institutions with regard to EU directives and European Central Bank
policy. At a sectoral level, European trade unions also tend to be members of Global Union Federa-
tions (GUFs) such as the International Metalworkers Federation or International Transport Workers
Federation, and European Industry Federations such as the European Metalworkers Federation and
the European Federation of Building and Wood Workers.
1Derek Simpson, speaking on the proposed merger of the UK’s UNITE union and the US based USW. [online
http://www.amicustheunion.org/default.aspx?page=6359 accessed 4/6/08]
2I am grateful to Rosemary Platt for this information.
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The rhetoric of international cooperation was described as being ahead of the reality, with calls
for international unity coming from leaders of unions a￿ected by globalisation rather than grass
roots3. Only about one percent of trade union budgets go to international activities. Cross border
collective bargaining is hampered by the fact that striking in support of workers abroad is illegal
in many European countries such as Germany. Though the ITUC does campaign for the right of
cross border sympathy strikes, the ITUC lacks leverage in negotiations and can only rely on the force
of arguments. Trade unions in developed countries have an incentive to support the ITUC as by
raising standards in developing countries, unions in richer countries bene￿t by reducing the outside
option of internationally mobile ￿rms. The ITUC also has a role with regard to creating International
Framework Agreements. The ITUC does not negotiate with multinational ￿rms, but they do deal
with governments and international organisations such as the World Bank.
Though it is as yet unfeasible to collectively bargain pay across countries, agreements have been
reached on non-pay issues. International Framework Agreements (IFAs) are negotiated between MNEs
such as Mercedes and Peugeot and Global Union Federations. Unions in developed countries use their
leverage to ensure core minimum labour standards are met in the ￿rm and their subsidiaries. In
an interview with Marcello Malentacchi of the International Metalworkers Federation, it was said
that the International Metalworkers Federation uses tactics such as protests at embassies, and use of
the internet has helped to coordinate this. They also use the tactics of social movements, such as
taking advantage of the fact that producers of consumer goods are sensitive to their public image.
As there is no global enforcement mechanism, enforcement requires an ability on the part of unions
to compel ￿rms to abide by the agreement. Approximately 90 per cent of IFAs were signed by ￿rms
with headquarters in Europe (Eurofound, 2009a).
European Framework Agreements are broader in scope than International Framework Agree-
ments. These are negotiated between European employer organisations (e.g. UNICE and CEEP) and
the ETUC, and then transformed into EU directives. It should be noted that EU directives are also
applied to trade unions outside the EU such as Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. European Frame-
work Agreements cover non pay issues such as agreements regarding parental leave, harassment and
violence at work, and health and safety issues (Eurofound, 2009b). In a case study of the European
chemical industry, Le Quex and Fajertag (2001) ￿nd there was modest transnational cooperation
among unions internationally, though wage policy has served as a fault-line. Cross-border collective
bargaining partnerships have been established by the European Metalworkers Federation (European
3Interview with James Howard of the ITUC
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Metalworkers Federation, 2009). These involve sharing of information by unions across borders and
the European Metalworkers Federation agreed common norms for wage policy. Taylor and Mathers
(2004) have suggested that the ETUC is undergoing a strategic shift from being an institutional social
partner with the EU to becoming a campaigning social movement. One would expect the level of
attention unions pay to the e￿ects of globalisation on the labour market would depend on the sec-
tor and skill levels of those they represent. It would be expected that sectors more a￿ected by ￿rm
mobility would place a greater emphasis on international cooperation. Also if low skilled workers are
more a￿ected than high skilled, as evidence of Braun and Sche￿el (2007) would suggest, then unions
representing low skilled workers will make greater e￿orts to cooperate internationally. There is some
anecdotal evidence to support this. In July 2008 Unite the Union, a British based union, and the US
based United Steelworkers agreed to merge into a global union, which bring together workers across
Britain, the Caribbean, Ireland and North America (New York Times, 2008). Both these unions rep-
resent blue-collar industrial workers. In contrast, Dorel Oancea, President of the FSCR (a federation
of cement producers trade unions in Romania), stated that for workers in cement factories the threat
of relocation is not very realistic, so globalisation is not very important to their members.
There has also been bilateral cooperation between trade unions. Romanian unions have advised
Spanish unions on how to recruit Romanian migrant workers in the agricultural sector, and Polish
unions have similarly assisted Irish unions in recruiting Polish migrant workers. Though these contacts
are often initiated between the unions, the various umbrella organisations also help to facilitate such
cooperation. Cooperation was shown when Polish and German workers for Volkswagen Engine agreed
not to take over production from another facility in the event of protest actions. Also, advanced
cooperation was shown during a down turn at an Eastern German plant, union representatives at
Polkowice (Poland) and Salzgitter (Western Germany) agreed to reduce production volumes at their
sites (Bernaciak, 2008). However such advanced cooperation is very much the exception rather than
the rule.
1.5 A simple model of international bargaining
In anticipation of the issues involving globalisation and labour markets discussed in chapters two
and three, a simple model is presented. The following model can help illustrate when unions will wish
to cooperate internationally. The key ingredients of the model are as follows:
 it is a partial equilibrium model
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 a multinational ￿rm has a plant in two countries, i and j
 unions bargain wages with the ￿rm in each country, but do not bargain over the level of em-
ployment
 unions decide whether to cooperate internationally, and
 workers have some hold up power, so they can not be simply replaced if bargaining fails.
For simplicity this model abstracts from costs of coordinating wage bargaining internationally,
however it can still provide some useful insights. Unions and the ￿rm bargain over a share of the
output of the ￿rm F (Hi;Hj), where Hi represents the number of workers employed in country i,
and Hj represents the number of workers employed in country j. It is assumed that workers within










< 0. When the union of one country
bargains alone it wishes to maximise its surplus from the bargain, Hi (wi    wi), where Hi, represents
the number of workers employed in the plant of country i, wi is the wage received if the union bargains
alone with the ￿rm and  wi is the reservation wage which workers can get from alternative employment.
The ￿rm will wish to maximise its surplus from the bargain which is the di￿erence between the pro￿ts
of the ￿rm if the bargain is successful and the ￿rm’s outside option. If the bargain is successful the
pro￿t of the ￿rm is given by F (Hi;Hj)   wiHi   wjHj which is simply output less the wage bill
for country i and country j. The outside option of the ￿rm is to continue production in the other
country in which case its pro￿ts will be F (0;Hj) wjHj. For simplicity it is assumed that wages are
bargained simultaneously in the two countries, so if wage negotiations break down in country i, the
￿rm or union can not renegotiate wages in country j. As is standard in the literature the bargain is
represented by the Nash product
max
wi
[Hi (wi    wi)]
i [F (Hi;Hj)   wiHi   wjHj   (F (0;Hj)   wjHj)]
1 i




F (Hi;Hj)   F (0;Hj)
Hi

+ (1   i)  wi: (1.1)
so workers are paid a weighted average of the marginal output of the plant they work in, F (Hi;Hj) 
F (0;Hj), and the reservation wage. Similarly for workers in country j,
wj = j

F (Hi;Hj)   F (Hi;0)
Hj

+ (1   j)  wj:
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If the two unions agree to cooperate internationally then they will bargain with the ￿rm over the




j are the coordinated wages for workers in country i and
j respectively. In contrast to when the unions bargain separately, now the outside option of the ￿rm
is zero, and the ￿rm’s surplus should bargaining be successful is given as F (Hi;Hj)   Hiwc
i   Hjwc
j.
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j = F (Hi;Hj) + (1   )(Hi  wi + Hj  wj) (1.2)
which shows the total wage bill to be a weighted average of the output of the ￿rm and the reservation
wages. The ￿rm is only concerned with the total wage bill and not how it is split between the workers
in the two countries. The two unions bargain with each other over how to share the total amount
of wages. If negotiations break down between the two unions and they do not agree to cooperate
internationally then their outside option is the wage gained by bargaining with the ￿rm alone, wi and













subject to equation (1.2), where  is the bargaining power of the union in country i when negotiating
with the union in country j. This leads to the total wage bill for country i as
Hiwc
i = ((1   )i +  (   j))F (Hi;Hj) + jF (Hi;0)   (1   )iF (0;Hj)
+ (1   (1   )i   )Hi  wi    (   j)Hj  wj
if unions coordinate, and for country j as
Hjwc
j = (j + (1   )(   i))F (Hi;Hj)   jF (Hi;0) + (1   )iF (0;Hj)
  (1   )(   i)Hi  wi + (1   j   (1   ))Hj  wj:
Of more interest however is the net bene￿t gained by unions cooperating internationally which is
Hiwc
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for workers in country j.
Looking at equation (1.3) gives insights as to when workers will wish to cooperate internationally.
It should be remembered that the cost of coordination is assumed to be zero, which is not the case in
reality (and in some countries such as Germany such international cooperation is illegal). Imposing
a coordination cost would lead to an indeterminacy when the unions bargain over their shares of
the total wage bill and what portion of the coordination cost they should pay, as workers are only
interested in the wage net of the coordination cost and are indi￿erent between the in￿nite wage and
coordination cost combinations that yield the same net wage. The size of the bene￿t of coordination
for workers in country i is clearly increasing in , the bargaining power of the union in country i when
negotiating with the union in country j. This is as they can capture more of the potential surplus
of coordinated bargaining at the expense of the other union. If the bargaining power of the unions
cooperating, , is greater than the sum of their bargaining power when bargaining separately, i +j,
then the net bene￿t is increasing in total output, F (Hi;Hj). This is as greater bargaining power
allows workers gain a greater share of output at the expense of the ￿rm. However, there is no reason
to expect that i +j would be greater than or less than , and it would prove an interesting area for









This would require that workers in the two countries are substitutes. If workers in the two countries
are complimentary then they are not as likely to bene￿t from coordination. This result is in line
with that of Stole and Zwiebel (1996) that when workers are substitutes (and the revenue-labour-
product function is concave) then workers will wish to bargain wages collectively, but when they are
compliments they will wish to bargain wages separately.
The net bene￿t to workers in country i is also decreasing in the reservation wage of country i
and j if  > i and  > j respectively. As seen from equation (1.1), if the value of i were low
(and the bargaining power for workers is higher when they cooperate internationally than act alone),
then the reservation wage would play an important role in determining the wage when the union in
country i bargains wages alone. A high reservation wage would thus reduce the bene￿t of cooperating
internationally. Though no such assumption is made in the model, it would be surprising if empirically
it was found that by cooperating internationally workers reduce their bargaining power with respect
to bargaining alone.
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In summary the results of this model suggest that unions are more likely to cooperate when their
bargaining power is increased by cooperating, when workers in the two countries are substitutes, and
in the case where bargaining power increases by cooperating internationally, when the reservation
wage is low. This is consistent with the case of the merger of Unite the Union and the US based
United Steelworkers.
There is agreement among trade unionists that there is little prospect of transnational collective
bargaining in the near future, due to di￿erent systems and regulations across countries. Sharing of
strike funds is one potential avenue of cooperation. However, there is as yet not su￿cient international
solidarity to support strike action across national borders. It is believed that the introduction of the
Euro will facilitate international wage bargaining, but that di￿ering trade union systems in di￿erent
countries pose an obstacle to wage bargaining. One potential area to improve cooperation is ensuring
that ￿rms do not move production from a unionised plant in one country during a strike to a unionised
plant in another country. Calmfors (2001) has suggested that EMU could lead to national coordination
of wage policy but that the coordination costs for transnational bargaining are most likely too high.
1.6 Conclusion
The face of European trade unionism has changed. Strikes are less common, centralised wage
bargaining has decreased, and for non-Ghent countries union density has declined. At the same time,
with the exception of the UK, over half of European workers are still covered by union agreements,
though data is missing for some countries. Also, for countries that have experienced declines in union
density, unionisation rates are stabilising. These two facts, plus the fact that European trade unions
continue to gain wage premia through collective bargaining, suggest that European trade unions
continue to play an important role in the labour market. Despite similar reasons being put forward
for the decline in trade union density across Europe, no cointegration was found between trends in
trade union density across Europe.
Globalisation has appeared as a challenge for European unions. There is evidence that multi-
national ￿rms reduce trade union wage premia and there is mixed evidence of the e￿ect of trade on
bargaining power. Globalisation has also had an a￿ect on the price elasticity of demand for labour,
which has a negative e￿ect on the wage/employment trade o￿. A simple model shows that unions
are more likely to cooperate internationally if workers are substitutes across countries, if cooperation
increases their bargaining power, and if the reservation wage is low. Trade unions are adapting to the
27
O’Farrell, Rory (2010), Globalisation and Labour Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/15663Chapter 1. The State of Trade Unions in Europe
globalised world, but at a slow pace.
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The E￿ect of International Firm
Mobility on Wages and
Unemployment
2.1 Introduction
On 1st November, 2006, the International Trade Union Confederation was formed in another
attempt for the workers of the world to unite. Trade unions feel threatened by the increasing mobility
of ￿rms and consider that they face "unbridled capitalist competition". When commenting on a
possible merger of a British and a US union, the joint general secretary of Britain’s largest union said:
￿Multinational companies are pushing down wages and conditions for workers the world
over by playing one national workforce o￿ against another." 1
Firms are now more mobile. Due to legislative and technological changes, capital mobility has in-
creased across the world. Following the introduction of the Single European Act, intra-EU foreign
direct investment (FDI) rose from 25 per cent of total inward stock in 1980 to 40 per cent in 1988, and
capital movement has largely been two way (Erickson and Kuruvilla, 1994). Pavelin and Barry (2005)
￿nd a signi￿cant increase in the geographical dispersion of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Europe
between 1987 and 1993. International capital has become more mobile due to reductions in barriers to
1Derek Simpson, speaking on the proposed merger of the UK’s UNITE union and the US based USW. [online
http://www.amicustheunion.org/default.aspx?page=6359 accessed 4/6/08]
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movements of capital such as lower transport costs for movement of capital goods, lower tari￿s, lower
costs of adapting equipment to foreign standards and conditions, lower costs of training workers to
use the equipment and lower costs in providing parts maintenance and customer service from abroad
(Eaton and Kortum, 2001). Trade unions have responded by increasing cooperation internationally,
and working through umbrella organisations such as the global union federations and the European
Trade Union Confederation, but so far cooperation in the area of transnational collective bargaining
has not taken place. Although ￿rm mobility may improve the bargaining position of ￿rms when the
demand for labour is held constant, it is important to understand the e￿ect of ￿rm mobility on wages
and unemployment in general equilibrium. In this paper I ask, what is the e￿ect of increased ￿rm
mobility on wages and unemployment?
Although market size is the most important determinant of where MNEs locate, labour market
institutions have a signi￿cant impact on ￿rm location (Bognanno et al., 2005). Despite their advantage
in bargaining, that MNEs pay higher wages has been described as a stylised fact (Conyon et al.,
2002). However, controlling for plant size and education greatly reduces the foreign ownership wage
premium (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2004). Heyman et al. (2007) ￿nd that there is no evidence that
foreign ￿rms pay identical workers higher wages, suggesting that the reason foreign ￿rms pay more
is due to them employing a higher proportion of skilled workers. Using UK data, Girma and Gorg
(2007) ￿nd that when a ￿rm is taken over by a US ￿rm that wages rise signi￿cantly, however there
is an insigni￿cant response when the ￿rm is acquired by an EU ￿rm. They suggest that this is due
to a larger technology gap between the US and the UK than the EU and the UK. This evidence
suggests that where multinationals pay more, it is due to higher productivity. Controlling for ￿rm
and individual characteristics, Braun (2008) ￿nds that the trade union wage premium disappears in
foreign ￿rms. Using German data Braun and Sche￿el (2007) estimate the e￿ect of outsourcing on
the union wage premium. They ￿nd that the wage premium is reduced for the low skilled in sectors
a￿ected by outsourcing while the wages of those not covered by collective agreements are una￿ected.
This supports the idea that once ￿rm and individual characteristics are controlled for, multinational
￿rms pay lower wages due to their advantage in bargaining.
I put forward a new mechanism for how globalisation can a￿ect labour markets. The model I
present is an extension of the new trade model of Markusen and Venables (1998) by including labour
market frictions and union bargaining. In the presence of union bargaining ￿rms have an incentive to
open a plant abroad to improve their outside option during bargaining. This leads to an increase in
the demand for labour. This e￿ect has been ignored in the partial equilibrium literature, where labour
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demand is constant. In addition, in the presence of frictional labour markets there is a possibility for
the increased demand for labour to lead to both lower unemployment and higher wages. The main
elements of my model are:
 two countries, with mobile ￿rms but immobile labour;
 multinational enterprises (MNEs) arise endogenously;
 labour markets are frictional, with a plant based union that bargains on behalf of workers; and,
 Cournot sector ￿rms believe they can a￿ect the product market but not the labour market.
I shall now explain how openness can lead to higher wages and employment. Imagine a two country
economy where there are no transport costs or labour market frictions, workers are paid their marginal
product, and there are no plant ￿xed costs, just headquarter ￿xed costs. In this economy ￿rms will be
indi￿erent as to whether they will operate as a national ￿rm or as a MNE. If the model is extended
to include a cost of transporting the good internationally and there are ￿xed costs in establishing a
plant then ￿rms face a trade o￿ as to whether they will operate as a national ￿rm and incur the cost
of transporting the good internationally or operate as a MNE and incur the ￿xed cost of having an
additional plant abroad. A model similar to this was examined by Markusen and Venables (1998).
However in their model full employment was assumed and they were not concerned by the e￿ect of
MNEs on wages. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that if it is more productive for ￿rms
to operate as MNEs, and they are permitted to operate, then real wages will rise due to the greater
output. If this model is extended to include labour market frictions and plant level wage bargaining
where workers are represented by a union there is an extra incentive for ￿rms to operate as a MNE.
Firms are motivated to become a MNE to reduce the outside option of workers in the wage bargain.
If bargaining breaks down between workers and a national ￿rm all the workers separate from the
￿rm. The outside option of the workers is unemployment and the outside option of the national ￿rm
is zero. For MNEs however, if bargaining breaks down in the home (foreign) plant, production can
continue in the foreign (home) plant so the outside option is positive. As I assume that unions cannot
cooperate internationally, MNEs are aware that every worker they hire in one plant will reduce the
wages of workers in the plant of the other country. Therefore, every extra worker in the foreign (home)
plant makes this outside option more attractive for the ￿rm. This is the strategic hiring incentive.
The direct e￿ect of this outside option is to reduce wages for workers in MNEs. However, what are
the indirect e￿ects? The general equilibrium e￿ects of hiring extra workers to a￿ect the wage bargain
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have been examined before, in a setting of individual rather than union bargaining over wages. In a
paper by Krause and Lubik (2007), where labour is the only factor, accounting for intra-￿rm bargaining
increases wages by about 20 per cent and unemployment declines about 15 per cent. In an unpublished
version of a paper by Cahuc et al. (2008), where both labour and capital are present, accounting for
intra-￿rm bargaining raises wages again by about 20 per cent and unemployment decreases by 12 per
cent if capital is held constant.
There are two homogeneous good sectors in the model. One good is a competitively traded good,
while the other good is characterised by Cournot competition. In the Cournot sector ￿rms hire a
large number of workers. Workers are represented by trade unions that bargain at the plant level. A
speci￿c resource is used only in the competitive sector. The strategic hiring incentive is important
as the increased demand for labour increases labour market tightness. This improves the value of
unemployment (which is the outside option for workers) by making it easier for unemployed workers
to ￿nd a job, and decreases the outside option for ￿rms by making it more di￿cult for ￿rms to ￿ll
a vacancy. Also, drawing labour into the Cournot sector increases the resource/labour ratio in the
competitive sector and increases wages in the competitive sector. This can increase wages in the
Cournot sector due to two feedback e￿ects. The ￿rst is that as wages are higher in the competitive
sector, the value of unemployment is increased for workers, as the value of alternative employment is
improved. Both these e￿ects improve the bargaining position of workers during wage bargaining and
lead to higher wages. Counterintuitively, the availability of an outside option to MNEs may actually
raise wages for all workers. The increased level of hirings also means more of the Cournot good is
produced which leads to a fall in prices, which increases the real wage for workers. Apart from the
direct negative e￿ect of the improved bargaining position of MNEs, there are other indirect negative
e￿ects. One is that drawing labour from the competitively traded sector reduces the supply of the
competitively traded good, increasing the price level. The second is that MNEs that are less e￿cient
than national ￿rms may be able to operate as they face lower wage costs than national ￿rms due to
their advantage in wage bargaining. This lower productivity per worker would lead to lower wages,
and as less of the Cournot good is produced, an increase in the price level.
The paper is organised as follows. In section two a review of some of the literature regarding wage
bargaining in open economies is presented. In section three I present the model and the equilibrium
is outlined. In section four, the results of the numerical analysis are presented. Section ￿ve concludes.
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2.2 Literature review
There has been much written in a partial equilibrium framework, where the demand for
labour is held constant, on the e￿ect of the international outside option of MNEs on wages. A review
of the microeconometric literature on FDI and labour markets is given by Gaston and Nelson (2002).
Zhao (1995) ￿nds that both one way and two way FDI decreases wages as it increases the outside
option of the ￿rm with respect to the case of no FDI. This is despite two way FDI increasing the
employment options of workers. In his framework unemployment is caused by the existence of a
union. In the model of Bughin and Vannini (1995) unemployment is again due to the attempt of
unions to gain wages premiums. With regard to inward investment, unions are indi￿erent to ￿rms
entering rather than exporting into the country if the plant they open is unionised and there is one
national union. However, if the new plant is not unionised unions would prefer the foreign ￿rm
export into the country as FDI would reduce their power. Skaksen and Sorensen (2001), again using
a partial equilibrium framework, ￿nd that if workers are complimentary then they may gain from
FDI. However if workers are substitutes in two countries then workers lose from FDI with Betrand
competition between the two unions for employment being the result if they are perfect substitutes.
This result is analogous to that of Stole and Zwiebel (1996) in that workers would bene￿t from being
in a single union if they are substitutes (where the labour revenue product function is concave), but
that they bene￿t from bargaining for wages separately if they are complimentary (where the labour
revenue product function is convex). Lorz (1997) uses a simple Bertrand model where unions compete
with each other to attract mobile ￿rms. Full employment is achieved by unions if they seek the world
competitive wage. However, as more countries are involved, union leverage goes to zero, and wages
reach the competitive wage. Straume (2003) looks at how trade and FDI interact. He ￿nds that
workers in a unionised ￿rm would be happy to merge with a non-unionised ￿rm if trade costs are
high, as the unionised plant is not under pressure to keep costs low so as to keep exports competitive.
FDI can also reduce wages in richer countries by moving jobs to poorer countries. Leahy and Pavelin
(2004) note that the advantage in wage bargaining gives ￿rms an extra incentive to open plants in
other countries.
Trade theory predicts a convergence of factor incomes, which would suggest a decrease in wages
in the richer country and an increase in the poorer country. Blecker (1996) ￿nds that in the short run
investment in the poorer country may stimulate demand in the richer country, and thereby increase
wages and employment in the rich country. In the medium term the e￿ect on workers in the richer
country is ambiguous as they can buy cheaper goods from the poorer country. Analysing a small open
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economy with capital mobility, Bertocchi (2003) ￿nds that factor incomes always converge, though
the income shares will not necessarily converge and depend on the bargaining institutions. There has
been relatively few models of open economies which include labour market matching frictions. Arnold
(2002) looks at North-South trade with labour market frictions. Unemployment in the Northern
country increases as the Southern country imitates the products of the Northern country. Faster
imitation leads to more frictional unemployment. In contrast, Janiak (2006) ￿nds that trade openness
leads to higher unemployment and higher real wages. This is due to larger more e￿cient ￿rms
expanding and hiring more workers, while smaller less e￿cient ￿rms go bankrupt. As the larger ￿rms
can produce goods more cheaply, the real wage increases, though Felbermayr et al. (2007) ￿nd that
average productivity may not increase due to transport costs and that unemployment should decrease
when the cost of posting a vacancy decreases relative to average ￿rm productivity. These models
however deal with trade and not the ability of ￿rms to locate abroad. Azariadis and Pissarides (2007)
looked at the e￿ect of international ￿nancial capital mobility on employment dynamics after shocks
to total factor productivity, multinational ￿rms were not included in the model. Mitra and Ranjan,
(2007) look at o￿-shoring and unemployment but ignore strategic hiring e￿ects.
In a general equilibrium model, Zhao (1998) again ￿nds that FDI leads to lower wages. However,
the e￿ect is reduced by ￿rm speci￿c bargaining and industry wide unions. Again the improved outside
option for ￿rms leads to a fall in wages. If both unions and bargaining are ￿rm speci￿c then unions
cannot play ￿rms against one another, leading to lower wages. Eckel and Egger (2009) look at the e￿ect
of multinationals on wage bargaining and ￿nd that ￿rm mobility leads to a rise in wages. Their model
extends that of Melitz (2003) to include MNEs. Wages rise due to MNEs having higher productivity.
Multinationals may locate abroad due to the potential to save money in the wage bargain. However,
there are no labour market matching frictions, and ￿rms simply choose the number of workers so their
marginal return equal wages. Unemployment is largely ignored.
2.3 The model
The model I present extends the "new trade" model of Markusen and Venables (1998) by
including labour market frictions and bargained wages. There are two countries, a home country h
and a foreign country f; and two homogeneous goods, X and Y . The Y sector good is a competitively
traded good and the X sector is characterised by Cournot competition. Countries are endowed with a
continuum of two factors, labour (L), and resources (R). Resources are only used in the competitively
traded good sector. In this paper a star is used to denote things that happen in country f. So, R is
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the resource endowment in country h and R is the resource endowment of country f. I only present
the equations for one country to avoid duplication. Though labour is mobile between sectors, it is
immobile between countries. The competitively traded good sector ￿rms are small and produce in only
one country (though they may sell their product in either country). In contrast, ￿rms in the Cournot
good sector may operate as national ￿rms which produce in only one country, or as MNEs and have
production plants in both countries. Time is discrete. In presenting the model I shall ￿rst outline
the labour market and workers value functions. I shall then outline the product market, showing how
the utility function leads to product demands and solving the problem of the ￿rm leads to product
supply. I then proceed to explain the key element of the model, how wages are bargained. Finally for
this section, the equilibrium is outlined.
2.3.1 Labour market
The labour market is characterised by frictional unemployment. This means that if a ￿rm
posts a vacancy this period there is a probability that it shall ￿ll this vacancy and have a worker
next period. It is costly to post a vacancy. Country i has a continuum of measure L workers. There
is a Cobb-Douglas matching technology suv1 , which gives the total number of matches between
unemployed workers (the mass of workers looking for a job) with vacancies, where u is the mass of
unemployed workers in the home country, v is simply the total sum of the vacancies posted by the
di￿erent ￿rms operating in the home country, and  and s are parameters. It should be noted that u
is the mass of unemployed workers and not the rate of unemployment.
Dividing the total number of vacancies by the number of unemployed workers we get labour





Dividing the matching function by v we get the intensive matching function





If a ￿rm posts a vacancy this period, the probability that it will ￿ll the vacancy this period (and so
have a worker available to work next period) is given by q (). This term is increasing in u so the
more unemployment there is the easier it is for a ￿rm to ￿nd a worker.
2.3.1.1 Workers’ value functions
It is assumed that all agents in the economy are risk neutral. Workers in a country may work
for one of four types of ￿rm. They may work for
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 a competitively traded good sector ￿rm based in their home country,
 a Cournot sector national ￿rm based in their home country,
 a Cournot sector MNE ￿rm based in their home country, or
 a Cournot sector MNE ￿rm based in the foreign country.
Di￿erent types of ￿rms may pay di￿erent wages. The value to a worker of having a job depends on
the type of ￿rm he is working for, and depends on the wage he receives this period and the discounted





U0 + (1   )W k0
i

; k = Y;M;N; i = h;f; (2.3)
where wk
i is the wage, U0 is the value of being unemployed next period,  is the discount rate and
 is the exogenous probability that the worker will separate from the ￿rm at the end of this period.
The value of having a job is increasing in the wage, the value of continuing to have a job next period,
and due to the risk of unemployment it is increasing in the value of being unemployed. Subscript i
denotes the nationality of the ￿rm the worker is employed by, and is only relevant if the worker is
employed by a multinational ￿rm. The superscript k denotes the type of ￿rm, Y;N;M, the worker is
working for. Superscript Y is for a competitively traded good sector ￿rm, M is for a Cournot sector
MNE and N denotes a Cournot sector national ￿rm.
Unemployed workers do not participate in the product market. They do gain some utility, z, which
is the utility a worker receives from non-market activities. This can be considered home production
which the agent does not sell on the market. The value of being unemployed is
U = zP (Xc;Yc) +  ((1   q())U0 + q()E (W 0)): (2.4)
q() is the probability that a worker ￿nds a job this period. The value of unemployment is in nominal
terms so it was necessary to multiply z by the price index P (Xc;Yc). The origin of the price index is
outlined in the next subsection. The value of being unemployed is increasing in the value of z. Also,
as the average value of having a job next period, E (W 0), is greater than the value of unemployment
next period, the value of unemployment is increasing in q(). This means that with a tighter labour
market, and lower unemployment, the value of unemployment will be higher as it will make it easier
for the worker to ￿nd a job. As an unemployed worker does not know what type of ￿rm he will work
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for next, E (W 0) is simply a weighted average of the values of being employed in the various types of
￿rms and is given by

















where v is the total number of vacancies in the country, and  vk
i are the total number of vacancies
posted in the home country by a country i headquartered ￿rm, and where k = Y;M;N. It can also



















The competitively traded good serves as numeraire and is internationally mobile without any
cost of transportation. There are transportation costs if the Cournot good is shipped internationally.
A ￿rm in the Cournot sector can either be a national ￿rm which has a plant in only one country (and
which may export abroad), or a multinational enterprise (MNE), which has a headquarters in their
home country but a manufacturing plant in both countries. It is possible for national ￿rms and MNEs
to coexist. As with the model of Markusen and Venables (1998), costs (with the exception of hiring
costs which were not present in the model of Markusen and Venables (1998)) are measured in terms
of labour used. Labour is used in production in both sectors, however resources are only used in the
competitively traded sector. It is useful to think of Y as a competitively traded product which uses
the resource land. As in Markusen and Venables (1998), the utility of the representative consumer is
given by X
cY 1 
c , where Yc is the amount of the competitively traded good consumed in the country,






where n is the number of national ￿rms based in country h; n is the number of national ￿rms based
in the foreign country; m is the number of MNEs headquartered in the home country; and m is
the number of MNEs headquartered in the foreign country. XN
h is the amount of the Cournot good
produced by a home country based national ￿rm for the market of the home country. The subscript
index is for the country of origin of the ￿rm. Therefore XN
f is the amount of the Cournot good
produced by a foreign country based ￿rm and exported to the home country, XM
h is the amount of
the Cournot good produced by a home country headquartered MNE for its home market, and XM
f is
the amount of X produced by a foreign country headquartered MNE in its country h plant for the
market of country h.
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Using the budget constraint that national income equals national expenditure we get M =
P (Xc)Xc + Yc; where P (Xc) is the price of the Cournot good in the home country and M is the
national income of the home country. Though M is used to denote national income and as a super-
script to denote multinational ￿rms, it is believed that in their use they shall not cause confusion.




; Yc = (1   )M: (2.5)





By de￿nition as numeraire, the nominal price of the competitively traded good is equal to 1. The
price index for the economy is de￿ned as
P (Xc;Yc) = P (Xc)
 :
This was calculated by inserting equation (2.5) into the utility function, which gave an indirect utility
function in terms of prices and nominal income, and then rescaling.
2.3.2.1 Competitively traded good sector ￿rms
In the competitively traded sector ￿rms are small, with one worker per ￿rm. Therefore
the mass of workers, LY , and the mass of ￿rms in the competitively traded sector are identical.
Competitively traded good sector ￿rms consider themselves too small to a￿ect the market. The
￿rms use resources and one unit of labour. As the resource is freely traded and not subject to any
frictions, all the resource will be used each period, so R = LY ^ R . The amount of resources used by an
individual ￿rm is given by ^ R. There is no cost in trading the competitively traded good internationally.
Competitively traded good sector ￿rms only have one worker and there are no competitively traded
good sector MNEs. The value this period of a ￿lled job to an entrepreneur in the competitively traded
sector is given as
JY = y   wY   r ^ R +  (1   )JY 0; (2.6)
where we have the production technology y = ^ R1 , and r is the rental rate of resources in the home
country, wY is the wage and  is the exogenous probability that the job-worker pair will separate.
This is the probability that either the ￿rm will exit, , or the worker will leave the ￿rm, e , and
 =  + e    e . Why exogenous ￿rm exit is required is explained in the appendix. If  = 1 then the
speci￿c resource is irrelevant. A lower value of  increases the e￿ect that drawing labour from the
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competitively traded sector has on wages. 1    is the share of output in the competitively traded
sector that goes to resources. Maximising the above for ^ R and using the fact that all ￿rms in the
competitively traded sector act symmetrically, we get that












The value of posting a vacancy in the competitively traded sector is
V Y =  P (Xc;Yc) + (1   )
 
q ()JY 0 + (1   q ())V Y 0
; (2.9)
where  is the real cost of posting a vacancy and q () is the probability that the ￿rm will ￿ll the
vacancy. When a ￿rm decides to post a vacancy they take  as given.  is the exogenous probability
that the ￿rm will cease to exist. As a ￿rm is deemed to exist from the moment it posts a vacancy,
there is a possibility that the ￿rm will expire before it even manages to hire a worker.
Due to the free entry condition V Y  0. In the steady state this holds with equality where there
is a positive number of competitively traded good sector ￿rms operating in the home country. Due
to the nature of the Cobb-Douglas production function, in the steady state there will always be a
positive number of competitively traded good sector ￿rms operating in the home country whenever
R > 0. This, combined with equation (2.9) leads to
JY 0 
P (Xc;Yc)
 (1   )q ()
; (2.10)
with equality in the steady state if R > 0. The ￿rm has a value due to the barrier to entry caused
by the cost of labour market frictions.
P (Xc;Yc)
q ()
is the nominal cost of ￿lling a vacancy. The value
of a ￿lled job is increasing in labour market tightness, and decreasing in unemployment. This is as if
the labour market is tight it is harder to ￿ll a vacancy and more di￿cult for new ￿rms to enter the
market. Dividing the cost of ￿lling a vacancy by  (1   ) gives the undiscounted value of having a
￿lled job next period.
2.3.2.2 Cournot sector ￿rms
Good X is a homogeneous good and ￿rms producing good X act according to Cournot
competition, taking the competitively traded good as numeraire. Cournot sector ￿rms are aware of
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their e￿ect on the price of the good but take the actions of the other ￿rms as given. There is a cost
 associated with transporting the Cournot good internationally. Firms in the Cournot sector are
either national ￿rms or MNEs. In the model of Markusen and Venables (1998), ￿rms function as
MNEs in order to avoid the shipping cost. In this model there is the added motivation of possibly
reducing labour costs by improving the ￿rms bargaining position. The superscripts N;M designate
whether the ￿rm is a national ￿rm or a multinational respectively. Technology in the Cournot sector
is increasing returns to scale. Firms need a minimum number of plant workers, G, and headquarter
workers, F, before they can produce and sell their goods. It takes one worker to produce one unit of
the good. Trade costs, , are also in terms of the number of workers needed to transport the good.
The nationality of a MNE is de￿ned by the location of its headquarters, which is where it employs
F headquarter workers. Cournot ￿rms are large and hire a continuum of workers, allowing the use
of the law of large numbers. Therefore the probability that a worker separates from the ￿rm can
be interpreted as the proportion of workers separating from the ￿rm at the end of the period. It
is assumed that ￿rms cannot switch from being a national ￿rm to a MNE or vice versa. The ￿rm
makes its decision as to what type of ￿rm it will be when it forms. This restriction does not pose any
problems as I solve for the steady state and I do not examine the dynamics of the model. Though
Cournot sector ￿rms consider they are large enough to a￿ect the price of the Cournot good, they do
not account for any e￿ect they may have on the labour market, on national income or the price index
for the economy.
Firms face a trade o￿ as to whether they will face the transportation cost when exporting, or if
they will open a second plant abroad and face the cost of paying wages to non-production workers
in the foreign plant. The number of workers employed in non-production activities and transport
activities has an important e￿ect on productivity in the Cournot sector and therefore the wage. If
workers are diverted to non-production activities by MNEs opening second plants in order to gain an
advantage in wage bargaining, then productivity and wages can fall. I will now outline the problem
facing national ￿rms and MNEs.











h + P (X
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the law of motion for hiring workers
HN 0 =

1   e 

HN + q ()vN; (2.12)
and that production is constrained by the number of workers hired by the ￿rm and the number of
workers required for non-production functions
HN = F + G + XN
h + (1 + )XN
h ; (2.13)
where vN are the vacancies posted and HN is the number of workers hired by the national ￿rm. The
value of the ￿rm is simply the revenue minus the wage cost and cost of posting vacancies, plus the
discounted probability of the value of the ￿rm next period. I assume the cost of posting a vacancy, ,
is paid by the ￿rm to some agency in their own country who has the same consumption preferences
as anyone else in that country. While the cost of posting a vacancy is constant in real terms, from
equation (2.12) it can be seen that the cost of ￿lling a vacancy is increasing in labour market tightness
and decreasing in unemployment. Equation (2.13) shows that F headquarter non-production sta￿
and G plant non-production sta￿ are required in order to produce the good. As can be seen, the ￿rm
discounts the future due to both impatience and also as there is the probability that the ￿rm will exit
at the end of the period. Using the ￿rst order conditions for XN
h and XN
h we can get the quantities of























 (1 + )M (X
c)
2 Xc + X
cMX2
c + (1 + )
 











It is ambiguous as to whether XN
h is increasing or decreasing in . A decrease in  means there are
more workers available for production which could lead to an increase in XN
h . However, it also means
it is cheaper to export. When there is more than just one ￿rm in the Cournot sector, XN
h , is strictly















as REV N = P (Xc)XN
h + P (X
c)XN
h . It is quite clear that revenue increases with the number
of employees hired by the ￿rm, and is decreasing in the number of non-production workers (F + G)
required. The ￿rst order condition for vacancies (using the assumption that next period the ￿rm will
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 (1   )q ()
:
Similar to the case for the commodity sector, equation (2.10), the discounted nominal bene￿t of having
an extra worker next period is equal to the nominal cost of ￿lling a vacancy.









@HN HN   wN
h + P (Xc;Yc)






@ HN : (2.15)
The bene￿t of having an extra worker comprises of a strategic hiring e￿ect, the bene￿t of not needing
to incur the expenses of replacing the worker, an e￿ect on revenue, minus the wage of the worker.
@wN
h
@HN is a strategic hiring e￿ect. Due to Cornot competition and the concave labour revenue product
function, adding one more worker will a￿ect the wage of the other workers. P (Xc;Yc) (1 ~ )
q() is the
bene￿t of not needing to replace a worker. It takes account of the probability ~  that the worker will
separate from the ￿rm due to natural wastage. The last term on the right is also the shadow price of
not being able to hire workers instantly. When calculating @ REV
N
@ HN one must take note that HN has
an e￿ect on Xc and X




Xc + (1 + )X
c  
 









This term is positive so long as there is more than one ￿rm in the Cournot good sector. The value of
a start up national ￿rm in the X sector is
V N (0) = max
vN

 P (Xc;Yc)vN + (1   )V N  
HN 0	
subject to
HN 0 = q ()vN:
This is identical to the value of a national ￿rm, but with HN = 0.





 (1   )q ()
;
so new ￿rms will post as many vacancies as are necessary to have the same number of workers as other
￿rms that are already operating. All operating national ￿rms have the same number of workers.
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Due to the free entry condition, V N (0)  0, with equality if n > 0: We can substitute out vN





 (1   )q ()
(2.16)
with equality in the steady state when n > 0. This is very similar to equation (2.10), and shows an
equal value per ￿lled job for the two types of ￿rm. This is as both types of ￿rm only hire in one
country, they face identical hiring costs, and due to the free entry condition, when n > 0 vacancies
will be posted for both types of ￿rm so the the value of a ￿lled job will be the same in each ￿rm.
MNEs I now present the problem of the multinational ￿rm. This is slightly more involved as the
MNE has workers in both countries. Both plants produce the same good and the workers in both
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1   e 

HM
h + q ()vM
h ; (2.19)
HM




h = G + XM
h : (2.21)
Similar to the value function for national ￿rms, the value of MNEs is given by the revenue, minus
the wage and vacancy costs, plus the discounted value of the ￿rm next period. As can be seen from
equation (2.20), the ￿rm needs at least F +G workers in the home plant to ful￿ll headquarter services
and plant services. As G is the minimum number of people required for each plant, a lower value of
G makes it easier for a ￿rm to open a plant abroad. Also, a lower value of F, makes it easier for the
￿rm to move its headquarters. Equations (2.20) and (2.21) show the role of labour market tightness
in hiring workers, as a loose labour market, and high unemployment, make it easier to ￿nd a worker.


























(1   )q ()
;
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; (2.22)
where REV M
h = P (Xc)XM






























Though similar to the envelope condition for national ￿rms (equation 2.15) a crucial di￿erence is
that hiring workers in one plant also lowers the wage bill in the second plant. The is shown by












in the envelope conditions. It is this which makes the
strategic hiring e￿ect stronger for MNEs and why ceteris paribus they hire more workers than national
￿rms. This leads to a greater number of vacancies posted and greater labour market tightness.
As MNEs do not export we can take the amount of the Cournot good supplied to each market
directly from the constraints (2.20) and (2.21). Similar to the national ￿rm case we have that the
value of a start up national ￿rm in the Cournot sector is












Due to the free entry condition, V M (0;0)  0, with equality in the steady state if m > 0. We can
substitute out vM
h and vM



















with equality when m > 0. This is somewhat di￿erent from equation (2.10) and equation (2.16) in
that the undiscounted value of the ￿rm is equal to the cost of hiring the full complement of workers
in both countries.
2.3.3 Wage bargaining
When bargaining wages workers would like to maximise their surplus of being employed,
Wk
i  U. Due to the cumbersome nature of the equations it is useful to substitute out all the elements
agents take as given during the wage bargain. These are taken as given as agents either consider
themselves too small to a￿ect these variables or cannot commit to future variables. Setting Wk
i = U,
and rearranging for wages, we get a variable that only includes variables taken as given by agents.
The subscript i refers to the nationality of the ￿rm the worker is working for, and is only relevant if
the worker is employed by a MNE. Thus we can de￿ne
!k
i = zP (Xc;Yc) + 
 




k = Y;N;M; i = h;f: (2.25)
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From this it is easy to show that
Wk
i   U = wk
i   !k
i ; k = Y;N;M: (2.26)
!k
i is taken as given by ￿rms and workers. It can be interpreted as a reservation wage for bargaining
this period. This term is useful as it summarises the external labour market in￿uences on the wage
bargain. This reservation wage is increasing in q() and decreasing in unemployment, so when the
labour market is tight workers will have a higher reservation wage. It is increasing in the average
value of employment in the economy and z. It is decreasing however in Wk0
i . This is as workers are
willing to accept a lower wage this period in anticipation of bargaining a higher wage next period.
Workers may even be willing to accept a wage below zP (Xc;Yc). Using this substitution is useful,
though it in no away a￿ects the results of the model. The steady state value of wages are presented
in the appendix.
2.3.3.1 Competitively traded sector
As is standard in the literature wages are negotiated through Nash bargaining. The Nash
product shows how the total bene￿t of the match, which is the production that will occur plus the
value of not requiring to post another vacancy, will be divided between ￿rms and workers. The Nash







where  is the bargaining power of workers. This leads to



















A + (1   )!Y :
This is a weighted average of the total bene￿t of the match and the reservation wage. The value of
not needing to post the vacancy again, P (Xc;Yc) (1 ~ )
q() , is increasing in labour market tightness,
which serves to increase the wage.
2.3.3.2 Cournot sector national ￿rms
Cournot sector ￿rms are large, and a union negotiates wages on behalf of all workers in
the ￿rm. If negotiations break down all the workers are sacked. This, combined with the free entry
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condition, means the outside option for the ￿rm is zero. When modelling, the choice of outside
option can depend on the motivation agents have on reaching an agreement, and can be either the
income streams that agents receive during a dispute or their best alternative if negotiations break
down (Binmore et al., 1986). As there is no strike-pay provided by unions, and ￿rms have no revenue
if there is a dispute, the outside options given are appropriate for both motivations.
The union wishes to maximise the surplus of the state of employment over unemployment for
the members of the union. The union only bargains over wages and not over employment. There are
criticisms over this right-to-manage approach (a discussion is given in Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004),
such as that it does not lead to Pareto e￿cient outcomes. However, there are two reasons why in this
case it is appropriate. The ￿rst is that workers and ￿rms take the number of workers in the ￿rm as
given. This is due to the labour market frictions. The ￿rm cannot hire more workers this period, so
it can only reduce the number of workers. However, with a right to manage approach the ￿rm will
have posted vacancies anticipating the wage, and so will have no incentive to reduce the number of
workers. The second reason is that there is no commitment mechanism. Wages are renegotiated each
period, so though it is possible to bargain over the number of vacancies, the ￿rm may renege on hiring
these workers next period. Also it would be di￿cult to understand what bene￿t current members
gain from future hirings. Therefore the right to manage approach is the appropriate method.















= V N  
HN
: (2.28)
It is interesting to note that in the steady state the wages of those working for Cournot sector national
￿rms and competitively traded good sector ￿rms are the same. Using the free entry conditions it can
easily be shown that in the steady state V N  
HN
= HNJY . Substituting this into equation (2.28),
it is easy to show that where national ￿rms exist in the steady state they will pay the same wage
as competitively traded good sector ￿rms. Given that national ￿rms and competitively traded good
sector ￿rms only employ workers in their home countries, and during wage negotiations neither has
the ability to continue production abroad if negotiations breakdown, it is perhaps not surprising that





HN + P (Xc;Yc)





A + (1   )!N:
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This is similar to the wage for the commodity sector in that it is a weighted average of the total bene￿t
of the match continuing and the reservation wage. The wage depends on the revenue per worker. As
there are F +G workers engaged in plant and headquarter non-production activities, a high value for
F +G means that the revenue must be divided among more workers, leading to lower wages. Also for
every unit of the good exported, there are  workers involved in transporting the good rather than
production. A higher  also serves to reduce revenue per worker and the wage. It can be shown that
the wage for commodity sector ￿rms and Cournot sector national ￿rms are equal. It is useful at this







HN @ REV N
@ HN   REV N

;
which is used in the envelope condition for national ￿rms. It is ambiguous as to whether this term
will be positive or negative, but as F + G go to zero this term becomes strictly negative.
2.3.3.3 Cournot sector MNEs
Calculating wages for the case of MNEs is more di￿cult. This is as the negotiating position
of a ￿rm is improved if it has a plant abroad. This is because if negotiations break down in one
plant, it can continue producing in its plant in the other country, so long as this plant currently has
su￿cient workers for both headquarter and plant functions. This contrasts with Eckel and Egger
(2009) where the ￿rm does not face labour market frictions and can immediately increase the number
of workers in the other plant. It is assumed that unions only represent the workers in one plant of one
country, so there is no international cooperation between unions. Simultaneous bargaining is used.
This is chosen as it is a more simple method than non-simultaneous bargaining. The assumption does
not qualitatively a￿ect the results of the model. The ￿rm treats each bargaining unit (plant) as the
marginal production unit. Due to the concave labour revenue product function the ￿rm bene￿ts from
dividing workers into di￿erent bargaining units.
How wages are calculated in the foreign plant will be demonstrated ￿rst, followed by wages in
the home plant.
























is the outside option for the ￿rm. As workers are split between two countries, workers
bargain with management over the marginal, rather than the total, bene￿t of that production unit
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continuing to produce. It is assumed that if negotiations break down in the foreign plant then all the
workers in the foreign plant are sacked. However, the ￿rm still has workers working in the domestic
plant so the ￿rm may operate similarly to a national ￿rm for one period. As the ￿rm operates
under Cournot competition it assumes its actions have no e￿ect on national income or labour market
tightness. This assumption is kept even if negotiations with workers break down. The ￿rm does
assume it has an e￿ect on the product market, though it ignores the possible reaction of other ￿rms.
Using these assumptions we get
^ X





c shows the of quantity of the Cournot good consumed in the foreign country in the case of
negotiations breaking down in the foreign plant, and ^ XM
h is the amount of the Cournot good that
will be supplied by the ￿rm to the foreign country if negotiations break down. A hat over a variable
signi￿es the value of that variable when negotiations break down in the foreign plant. The outside















A + (1   )!M
h ;
where d REV M
h is the revenue of the ￿rm if negotiations break down with workers in the foreign plant.
It is interesting to note the di￿erence between the wage equations for MNEs and for national ￿rms.
The inclusion of the term d REV M
h shows that the greater is d REV M
h the lower will be the wage for
workers in the foreign plant. As there are G non-production workers in the foreign plant, a high value




























































be negative as REV M
h > d REV M
h and the labour revenue product function is concave.
Wages in the home plant If negotiations break down in the home plant production may continue in
the foreign plant. However this requires HM
h > F +G, as the foreign plant must perform headquarter
operations as well as plant operations. A tilde over a variable signi￿es the value of that variable if
negotiations break down with workers in the home plant.
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is the value of the ￿rm if negotiations break down with workers in
















A + (1   )!M
h ;
where g REV M
h is the revenue of the ￿rm if negotiations with the home plant break down. If HM
h <
F +G; then g REV M
h = 0. As when bargaining with the workers in the foreign plant, a higher g REV M
h
results in a lower wage.
Again, if negotiations with home workers breakdown then the ￿rm can operate as a national ￿rm



















































will always be negative.
2.3.4 Equilibrium
In this section the equilibrium will be outlined. The model is solved for the steady state. It
should be noted that the model must be solved numerically. Each period the proportion  of each
type of job is destroyed. In the steady state these jobs must be replaced. The precise breakdown of
how new ￿rms are replaced is outlined in the appendix. The total number of jobs in the economy is
given by nHN + mHM
h + mHM






h + LY 
q ()
: (2.32)
As nHN + mHM
h + mHM
h + LY is simply employment, the level of unemployment is given by




h + LY 
: (2.33)
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h + LY 
:
National income is given by
M = R1   
LY 










which is the sum of the competitively traded good produced, the total output of national ￿rms in the
home country, the total revenue of a home country based MNEs less the wages they pay to foreign
workers plus the wages earned by workers in the home country that work in foreign country based
MNEs. I assume that the costs of posting a vacancy are part of the national income of the country
where the ￿rm is headquartered, so there is no need to subtract this from these ￿rms’ revenues in order
to calculate national income. De￿ning world income as the combined income of the both countries,
and using equation (2.5) we get
Mw = M + M =




Y + Y 
1   
which leads to
M = Mw   M:
The model can be reduced to ￿nding 15 variables. To reduce this complexity only the symmetric
case is solved. This reduces the model to eight unknowns. Focusing on symmetric countries is
satisfactory as according to UNCTAD (2008) data 68 per cent of inward FDI is to developed countries
and 92 per cent of outward FDI is from developed countries. The model is solved using the Newton
method of convergence. However, we have a nonlinear system and the free entry conditions lead to
the inequalities (2.16) and (2.23). To solve the model numerically it is necessary to deal only with
equations. In the Cournot sector there are four possible types of ￿rms; national ￿rms of countries h
and f, and MNEs based in countries h and f. This leads to three possible cases. The following table
outlines the possible cases.
Case Subcases
1 n > 0 m > 0 a;b
2 n > 0 m = 0
3 n = 0 m > 0 a;b
Note that there is also a column marked subcases. This is as when a MNE is bargaining there
is a kink in the equation for how hiring in the foreign plant a￿ect wages. This is as if negotiations
break down in the home plant, a minimum of F + G workers are needed to continue production in
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the foreign plant, as both plant and ￿rm operations must be conducted in the foreign plant. Subcase
a is where HM
h > F + G and subcase b is where HM
h  F + G.
A simulation is carried out targeting plausible statistics of the small open European economies.
The discount rate, , was chosen to re￿ect each period lasting one month. The labour share of income
is largely determined by the parameter , and is given as 62:5 per cent. The rate of unemployment
is 5:69 per cent. The average duration of unemployment is 3:37 months and the average time to
￿ll a vacancy is just over six months.  was chosen so as to have approximately 20 per cent of
those employed working in the Cournot sector and  was chosen so as to have a solution with both
MNEs and National ￿rms operating and to have a plausible percentage of the employed workforce in
multinationals (a ￿gure of 15 per cent for the UK is given in Dri￿l (1999)). z was chosen to have a
plausible utility of unemployment. The parameters chosen for the model are given in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Parameter values
L R      ~    s  F + G z
:5 :35 :6
10000
10033 :5 :13 :008 :01 :5 :2 :23 :08217 :03 :2
2.4 Results
In this section I shall ￿rst present the results for a simpli￿ed model, where national ￿rms and
MNEs have identical cost structures and trade costs are set to zero (  = G = 0). Next the results of
the full model are presented. This allows a comparison with the standard trade models. The baseline
chosen is where trade exists between two countries but MNEs are suppressed. This contrasts with
Eckel and Egger (2009) where they chose autarky as the baseline. As this paper concerns the e￿ect of
MNEs on bargaining, by comparing the model with trade but suppressed MNEs with the fully open
economy we avoid confusion as to which e￿ects are due to trade and which are due to MNEs. Finally
the results of the model are presented where the international strategic hiring incentive is suppressed.
This allows a comparison to be made which shows the importance of this e￿ect. The wages in the
model are presented in terms of the competitively traded good. It must be remembered however that
the price of the Cournot good may be di￿erent for di￿erent parameters. In order to make a valid
comparison of wages for the di￿erent cases it is necessary to divide all nominal variables by the price
index.
Table 2.2 shows the results of a simpli￿ed version of the model. In this setup national ￿rms
have no advantage over MNEs, but MNEs have an advantage during wage bargaining, so both will
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Table 2.2: Results of simpli￿ed model. All values are in real terms.
Suppress MNEs MNEs allowed
Unemployment rate 0.0568851 0.0547885
Average wage 0.56044 0.576088
Competitively traded good sector wage 0.56044 0.576934
Cournot sector wage 0.56044 0.572712
Number of national ￿rms 1.25181 0
Number of MNEs n/a 0.790848
National income 0.422715 0.435704
Competitively traded good sector employment 0.377535 0.377842
Workers per national ￿rm 0.0751088 n/a
Workers per MNE (home plant) n/a 0.0599125
Workers per MNE (foreign plant) n/a 0.0599125
Cournot good consumption 0.0564678 0.0710379
Unemployment duration 3.36586 3.23461
Vacancy duration 5.61628 5.84416
Labour share of income 0.625196 0.62488
Share of workforce in MNEs n/a 0.200513
Output per Cournot sector worker 0.600579 0.749635
never coexist. As can be seen from Table 2.2, permitting MNEs leads to 2:8 per cent higher average
wages, 24:8 per cent higher output per Cournot sector worker, 3:07 per cent higher national income,
larger ￿rm size (though plant size is smaller) and 3:69 per cent lower unemployment. When MNEs are
allowed, although MNEs pay lower wages than competitively traded good sector ￿rms, MNE wages are
still higher than the wages of national sector ￿rms in the case where MNEs are suppressed. Wages are
pushed higher by increased tightness of the labour market and by the fact that workers are diverted
from the competitively traded sector, increasing the marginal productivity of workers in that sector.
As MNEs have an incentive to hire more workers there is an economy of scale e￿ect. As there are
no extra costs to setting up an extra plant, and MNEs hire extra workers, output per Cournot sector
worker is higher. This increases the output for which unions bargain over, and reduces prices. Despite
the higher wages, labour’s share of income declines.
Now results for the full model are presented. To analyse the e￿ect of MNEs on labour markets
results for the economy where MNEs are suppressed and where MNEs need di￿erent levels of support
sta￿ are presented. The e￿ect of increasing openness to MNEs is seen by increasing the relative
e￿ciency of MNEs with respect to national ￿rms, and the number of non-production workers in a
national ￿rm is kept constant. This is done by adjusting the ratio of non-production workers in a
national ￿rm to non-production workers in a MNE. This is given by F+G
F+2G. Reducing the number of
non-production workers needed to perform plant operations makes it easier for MNEs to enter. The
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relative number of MNEs and national ￿rms in the model is sensitive to the ratio of MNE and national
￿rm ￿xed costs. Only when the ratio is between 1:799875 and 1:800034 do MNEs and national ￿rms
coexist. This is as only the symmetrical case is shown. In the model of Markusen and Venables (1998)
MNEs dominate when countries are symmetrical.
Figure 2.1: Results: Decrease in unemployment for an increase relative e￿ciency of multinational
corporations.
As can be seen from Figure 2.1 opening an economy to MNEs leads to an unambiguous decrease in
unemployment. The sharp decrease in unemployment occurs where national ￿rms and MNEs coexist.
Here the decrease is due to the extra hiring of MNEs rather than any improvement in productivity.
The more gradual decrease after this is due to productivity changes rather than the tendency of MNEs
to hire extra workers.
Figure 2.2 shows the e￿ect of increasing openness on wages and productivity. The results are
given as a percentage of wages and productivity when MNEs are suppressed. As can be seen, when an
economy opens up Cournot sector productivity decreases. This is as MNEs become more important
to the economy. MNEs can actually have lower productivity than national ￿rms. This decrease in
output per Cournot sector worker is despite the number of non-production workers for national ￿rms
remaining constant and the number of non-production workers required for MNEs actually decreasing.
This is as MNEs have more workers involved in non-production activities, working in a second plant,
so as to have an advantage in wage bargaining. MNEs can still successfully compete with national
￿rms as they pay lower wages. As can be seen in the graph where wages and productivity sharply
decrease, Cournot sector wages decrease more than Cournot sector productivity. This is due to the
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Figure 2.2: Results: Change in wages and productivity for an increase in relative e￿ciency of MNEs
fact that MNEs have a better outside option to national ￿rms and so reduce wages. Looking at where
the output per Cournot sector worker is identical for the open economy case and where MNEs are
suppressed (where the ratio of MNE to national ￿rm non-production workers is 1:779185) we see that
average wages are 0:13 per cent below the average wage for where MNEs are suppressed. This is as
the strategic hiring e￿ect is not enough to overcome the advantage of MNEs in bargaining, though
it does help to mitigate the decrease. Wages in the competitively traded sector are 0:05 per cent
higher however. This is due to the e￿ect of workers being drawn from the competitively traded sector
leading to a higher ratio of resources per worker in the competitively traded sector. It can be shown
that national income is higher by 0:08 per cent and unemployment is lower by 1:93 per cent when
MNEs are permitted and output per Cournot sector worker is kept constant. Output per Cournot
sector worker must be at least 1 per cent higher before average wages in the fully open economy
case are equal to the case where MNEs are suppressed. For Cournot sector wages in the fully open
economy case to be equal to the suppressed MNEs case Cournot sector productivity must be 6:4 per
cent higher. It should be remembered that the higher productivity is solely due to scale e￿ects and
not to technological di￿erences. In the full model the e￿ect of MNEs on wages depends crucially on
the number of non-production workers required in a second plant.
Finally, Table 2.3 helps to show the importance of accounting for the international strategic
hiring incentive. In the ￿rst column only national ￿rms are permitted. In the second column the












= 0). It should be noted that for
this column national ￿rms are also suppressed as if they were allowed to enter then national ￿rms
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Table 2.3: Results with international strategic hiring incentive suppressed
Ratio of MNE to national ￿rm non-production workers 1.779185
MNEs suppressed MNEs permitted
Unemployment rate 0.0571037 0.0584172
Average wage 0.557616 0.53689
Competitively traded good sector wage 0.557616 0.537193
National ￿rm wage 0.557616 n/a
MNE wage (home plant) n/a 0.537829
MNE wage (foreign plant) n/a 0.532769
Number of national ￿rms 1.25388 n/a
Number of MNEs n/a 1.0014
National income 0.420504 0.404541
Workers per national ￿rm 0.0749675 n/a
Workers per MNE (home plant) n/a 0.0539568
Workers per MNE (foreign plant) n/a 0.0399847
Cournot good consumption 0.0542863 0.0406229
Labour share of income 0.625171 0.624815
Output per Cournot sector worker 0.577511 0.431821
would dominate and we would have the same results as the ￿rst column. The second column shows the
same case as when Cournot sector productivity for the full model is equal to the national ￿rms only
model, with the exception of the international strategic hiring e￿ect being suppressed. Unemployment
is actually higher than the national ￿rms only case, average Cournot sector productivity is lower, and
wages are lower for all workers. Average wages are 3:7 per cent lower than the national ￿rm only case,
in contrast with a 0:13 per cent decrease when the international strategic hiring e￿ect is included,
showing the importance of this e￿ect in mitigating the e￿ects of international ￿rm mobility on wages.
2.4.1 Sensitivity analysis
To examine the robustness of the simulation results a sensitivity analysis was conducted on key
parameters. Overall the model was found to be robust to changes in parameter values, though unsur-
prisingly altering the parameters for workers bargaining power, , and the labour market matching
elasticity of vacancies, 1   , had the greatest impact. The sensitivity analysis for s, ,  and , are
presented below. The e￿ects of changes to , F + G, , and , were also performed, and the model
was robust to changes in these parameters. The results however are not presented due to reasons of
space.
As can be seen in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 the results are robust to changes in the parameter s. As
can be seen from equation 2.2, an increase in s increases the number of matches in the economy. As
would be expected, Figure 2.3 shows a fall in unemployment when there is an increase in the value of
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Figure 2.3: Sensitivity analysis: Changes in the value of s and unemployment
Figure 2.4: Sensitivity analysis: Changes in value of s and the average wage
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s. Similar to Figure 2.1, the horizontal lines of Figure 2.3 show the level of unemployment when only
national ￿rms are permitted, and the kinked lines show where MNEs are allowed to enter. As s a￿ects
the probability of ￿nding a match, increasing the number of matches lowers unemployment. With a
higher value of s it is slightly easier for MNEs to compete with national ￿rms, though the e￿ect is
small. This is because with lower unemployment there is a bigger market for the Cournot good. As
was shown by Markusen and Venables (1998), MNEs bene￿t more than national ￿rms from a larger
market at it is more cost e￿ective to open a new plant to serve a large market than a small market.
Figure 2.5 shows again that the percentage change in wages in very robust to changes in the value
of , though for a lower level of  it is easier for MNEs to enter the market. This is due to the role
of  in a￿ecting the importance of the speci￿c resource in the model. The higher the value of  the
less relevant is the speci￿c resource to the model.
As seen in Figure 2.6, a higher value of  leads to higher unemployment and makes it easier for
MNEs to enter the market. A low value of  results in a lower level of productivity in the competitive
sector. Therefore competitive sector ￿rms have less incentive to hire workers, and this leads to higher
unemployment. With a high value of  national income is higher, which bene￿ts MNEs. However
as MNEs need more workers performing headquarter and plant non-productive tasks than national
￿rms, the higher wage bill which spills over from the higher marginal productivity of labour in the
competitive sector actually serves to reduce the ability of MNEs to compete with national ￿rms.
The parameter  gives the labour market matching elastiticity of unemployment. This means
that if unemployment increases by one per cent there will be  per cent more matches in the economy.
1  is the labour market matching elasticity of vacancies. So increasing  makes unemployment more
important (and the number of vacancies less important) in determining the number of matches in the
labour market. As can be seen from Figure 2.8, reducing  reduces unemployment, and a lower level
of  also leads to the strategic hiring e￿ect having a greater impact. This is as increasing the match
elasticity of vacancies increases the impact of MNEs posting extra vacancies for strategic reasons.
Figure 2.7 also shows that with a low value of  the decrease in wages is mitigated by the strategic
hiring e￿ect to a greater degree than when  is high, the di￿erence is small. It should be noted that
in the steady state the number of vacancies posted is just su￿cient so as to replace the number of
jobs lost in a period. Overall, changes in the value of  have a small e￿ect on changes in the average
wage.
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Figure 2.5: Sensitivity analysis: Changes in the value of  and average wages
Figure 2.6: Sensitivity analysis: Changes in the value of  and unemployment
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Figure 2.7: Sensitivity analysis: Changes in the value of  and average wages
Figure 2.8: Sensitivity analysis: Changes in the value of  and unemployment
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Figure 2.9: Sensitivity analysis: Changes in value of  and unemployment
Figure 2.10: Sensitivity analysis: Changes in the value of  and average wages
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The parameter which has the greatest e￿ect on the results is . This is not surprising as 
determines the bargaining power of labour. With a high value of  MNEs will have a larger advantage
in bargaining over national ￿rms than in the case where worker bargaining power is low. As can be
seen in Figure 2.10 a high value of  makes it easier for MNEs to operate, due to their advantage in
wage negotiations. As can be seen in Figure 2.9 with a high value of  unemployment is higher as ￿rms
are less willing to open vacancies. Also the change in unemployment when MNEs enter the market is
greater when the value of  is high. This is as MNEs have a greater incentive to hire extra workers,
and the strategic hiring e￿ect is greater, when workers’ bargaining power is high. As can be seen in
Figure 2.10, despite the greater strategic hiring e￿ect, wages decrease by a greater percentage when
MNEs enter and  is high. This is due to two reasons. First, when workers’ bargaining power is high
the MNE e￿ect of dividing bargaining between two countries has a greater negative e￿ect on workers’
wages. The second reason is due to the role of non-production workers in a￿ecting productivity and
therefore wages. When workers’ bargaining power is high, ￿rms are more willing to hire non-production
workers abroad so as to reduce their wage bill. This increases the number of non-production workers
and reduces productivity and wages. These two negative e￿ects dominate over the positive strategic
hiring e￿ect.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper a new mechanism is put forward for how globalisation may a￿ect labour markets.
When ￿rms open a plant abroad to improve their outside option in the wage bargain and lower their
wage bill, the demand for labour increases. This can cause an increase in wages. In this paper it
has been shown that, for symmetric countries, in a simpli￿ed model where there are no international
trade frictions or extra costs in establishing a foreign plant (so national ￿rms and MNEs face identical
cost structures) increased ￿rm mobility can lead to higher wages. This is as MNEs strategically hire
extra workers to improve their outside option in the wage bargain. Increased ￿rm mobility leads to an
increase in the demand for labour. However using the full model it was found that the number of non-
production workers needed for plant operations plays a crucial role with higher plant level ￿xed costs
reducing the bene￿t of MNEs hiring extra workers. Increased openness leads to lower unemployment.
Only where MNEs have such an advantage so that national ￿rms will not enter in equilibrium will
openness lead to both lower unemployment and higher wages. This contrasts with Eckel and Egger
(2009) where MNEs always have higher productivity which increases the real wage. The decrease
in wages due to the improvement in ￿rms outside option during wage bargaining is mitigated by
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the international strategic hiring e￿ect. The importance of accounting for the international strategic
hiring motive of MNEs is shown by suppressing this e￿ect which leads to lower wages and higher
unemployment. The results were found to be robust to changes in key parameters. Overall the e￿ects
on wages and unemployment of allowing MNEs were small.
62




The E￿ect of International Trade on
Trade Union Density
3.1 Introduction
Trade unions have declined. Though there have been some exceptions, trade union density has
declined across the world. In most countries this decline has slowed and the stabilisation of union
densities has been as general as their decline. Unions tend very much to be national organisations,
linked to the peculiarities of their respective nations. However, the international parallels in the trends
of unionisation have been remarkable, and that these global parallel movements of trade union density
should occur at the same time as increasing globalisation suggests a link between the two.
At the same time as the fall in unionisation there has been an increase in the number of countries
in trade blocs. The European Union (EU) has expanded from six original members to nine in 1972,
to 12 by 1986, 15 in 1995, and by 2007, 27 countries were members of the European Union. The
depth of integration can also be charted by looking at the change of names from the European Coal
and Steel Community, to the European Economic Community, to the European Community, to the
present European Union. Though the EU is perhaps the best example of a trade bloc increasing in
size, there are others, such as NAFTA for North America and Mercosur for South America.
Figure 3.1 shows the similarity of trends in union density for six European countries which had
been EU members before 1980. There has been a similar movement in trade union density for European
countries, despite their having di￿erent trade union systems. This pattern takes the form of a peak
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Figure 3.1: Trade union density for selected EU countries. Source: Visser (2003)
in union density around the year 1980. It is also interesting to look at the pattern of unionisation of
the Nordic countries. As can be seen from Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, though Denmark has a level of
unionisation similar to Finland and Sweden, its trend has more in common with countries which were
members of the EU by 1973. In contrast, Sweden and Finland which joined the EU at the same time
show a similar trend in unionisation.
Figure 3.2: Trade union density for Nordic countries. Source: Visser (2003)
The increasing size and depth of trade blocs such as the European Union has been associated
with decreasing trade union density. Interestingly, despite the decline in unionisation, there is evidence
that the union premium has remained stable. Kaufman (2002) shows some evidence that union wage
premiums have remained stable since 1980, while Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) have found that though
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there were some rises and falls in wage premiums in some sectors, overall they remained stable. Also,
union wages performed better than non-union wages in the face of international competition, though
unions lost members. In an empirical investigation Slaughter (2007) examined how globalisation can
a￿ect trade union density. He found a link between foreign direct investment and falling unionisation
(though foreign a￿liates actually had higher levels of unionised workers) and did not ￿nd a relationship
between trade and falling unionisation. However, in his examination he looked at trade ￿ows, rather
than the number of countries with which a country trades.
In this paper I ask how does increasing the number of countries in a trade bloc a￿ect trade union
density?
Acemoglu et al. (2001) explain the decrease in union density as being the result of skill biased
technical change ending alliances between skilled and unskilled workers. I provide an alternative
explanation for the decrease in trade union density. I present a general equilibrium model with
endogenous trade union formation. I will show that increasing international competition can decrease
the rents available to ￿rms for which the union can bargain. This can make union membership less
attractive, and so decrease union membership, though wage premiums will remain stable. In order
to show the e￿ects of increasing the number of countries in a trade bloc has on union density a
general equilibrium model with labour market frictions is presented. The main ingredients of the
model are endogenous trade union formation; membership of a trade union is costly; there are many
symmetrical countries; the labour market is frictional; there are two homogeneous goods; and entry
into the Cournot sector is costly.
In this paper trade unions provide bargaining services. If the labour revenue product function of
a ￿rm is concave (Stole and Zwiebel, 1996), such as with Cournot competition, workers bene￿t from
combining together to bargain wages, as opposed to individual bargaining. Unions can bargain with
the ￿rm for the distribution of rents. However trade union membership is costly. Apart from the
￿nancial cost in terms of paying union dues each period, there are also costs such as the necessity of
union members to take part in union activities such as union meetings or voting at union elections.
These activities can occupy the time of workers, leaving less time for other activities. If an increase in
the number of countries in a trade bloc reduces the rents available, workers will be less willing to pay
the cost of union membership. As wages under union bargaining are a function of the average revenue
per worker of the ￿rm (as opposed to marginal revenue which is the case with individual bargaining)
union wages are more a￿ected by changes in international competition than non-union wages are.
Increased competition reduces the di￿erence between marginal revenue and price, so the di￿erence
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between average revenue and marginal revenue is also decreased. Therefore, the increase in the number
of countries in a trade bloc can help to explain the decrease in trade union density across the world.
Increasing the number of countries in a trade bloc leads to an increase in the number of ￿rms, and
this causes an increase in the level of product market competition, reducing rents. Huizinga (1993)
shows how greater integration can lead to lower wages due to product market competition, though
Naylor (1998) shows that with monopoly unions, integration can lead to higher wages. This is as if a
tari￿ decreases the demand for the ￿rm’s product may increase and this can cause an increase in the
wage.
I also provide a mechanism by which unionisation can increase when a small number of countries
join a trade bloc, but union density eventually decreases as more unions join the trade bloc. In this
paper, when countries open to trade there is an incentive for ￿rms to export, as they chase rents in
other countries. However, it is costly to transport goods internationally, and this cost is in terms of
workers employed to transport the goods. As more workers are employed to transport the good, this
means that less workers are available to produce the Cournot good. Production of the Cournot good
falls and its price rises. This bene￿ts the unionised workers more than non-union workers. This is as
this increase in price increases the average revenue per worker of a ￿rm more than it increases the
marginal revenue of the ￿rm. As being a member of a union becomes more attractive, more workers
are willing to pay the costs of union membership and join the union. As the number of countries in
the trade bloc increases, the e￿ect of increased product market competition becomes stronger than
the e￿ect of workers being diverted into transporting the good. After an initial rise in union density,
union density declines.
The paper is laid out as follows. In section two a brief review of the literature is given, in section
three the model is outlined, in section four the results of the model are given and section ￿ve concludes.
3.2 Literature review
Though there has been some empirical research on the decline in union density, there has been a
lack of theoretical research. Machin (2000) ￿nds the main reason that trade unions have declined in
Britain is a failure to organise in new establishments. Empirical research on the e￿ect of globalisation
on union density has been undertaken. For European economies Blaschke (2000) ￿nds that trade has a
small negative e￿ect on unionisation. Slaughter (2007) investigates the link between globalisation and
falling unionisation in the US. Though a link is found between increasing foreign direct investment
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and falling unionisation, no link is found with trade. However it was the level of trade, rather
than openness to trade which was examined. Using UK data Konings and Walsh (2000) ￿nd that
employment loss as a result of increased product market competition is higher in non-unionised ￿rms
than unionised ￿rms. This is as product market competition reduces the rents that unionised workers
can bargain over, thereby reducing the incentive to ￿re workers. Neumann and Rissman (1984) suggest
that unionisation has declined as governments now provide services that were previously provided by
unions, thereby reducing the selective incentive of joining a union. However, Waddington and Whiston
(1997) ￿nd that reasons to do with collective bargaining are the main reasons that people join unions
and that union services only play a secondary role. Schnabel and Wagner (2007) ￿nd that personal
characteristics and the characteristics of the workplace are important in determining who joins a union
and social characteristics play a minor role. They also point out that strike pay is a selective incentive
and that a cost bene￿t analysis of union membership ignores the free rider problem.
Although wage bargaining tends to be more centralised in Europe than in the US, ￿rm level
wage bargaining is still important. Using Swedish data Granqvist and RegnØr (2008) ￿nd that local
bargaining sign￿cantly raises wages, Plasman et al. (2006) ￿nds that local bargaining raises wages by
about four per cent in Belgium, Denmark and Spain. Braun and Sche￿el (2007) ￿nd that in Germany
those covered by a collective ￿rm agreement gain a premium of 5.7 per cent. For Italy, Dell ’Aringa
and Lucifora (1994) ￿nd a 4.4 per cent premium for blue collar workers and a 7.7 per cent premium
for white collar workers who are covered by ￿rm level collective bargaining agreements.
There has been a lack of general equilibrium models with endogenous union membership. Delacroix
(2006) presents a model in which some sectors are unionised and others are not. However he does not
look at why some ￿rms within a sector are unionised and others are not. Preugschat (2008) presents
a model where a centralised union decides how many ￿rms to organise and it is costly to organise a
￿rm. It is found that an increase in the entry and exit rate of ￿rms due to deregulation can lead to a
decline in union density.
3.3 The model
There are m symmetrical countries, and two homogeneous goods; a good characterised by Cournot
competition, X, and a competitively traded good, Y . Each country is equally endowed with a contin-
uum of two factors, labour (L), and resources ( R). It is useful to think of land as the resource. Labour
and resources are used in the competitively traded good sector and only labour is used in the Cournot
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sector. Though goods can be transported internationally, factors can not. Competitively traded good
sector ￿rms are small and produce in only one country (though they may sell their product in any
country). In contrast, ￿rms in the Cournot good sector are large and hire a continuum of workers.
Firms can not move internationally. There are no multinational enterprises. The competitively traded
good serves as numeraire for the economy. The competitively traded good can be freely traded in-
ternationally, though as all countries are symmetrical the competitively traded good is not traded
in equilibrium. There are no costs to entering the competitively traded good sector apart from the
cost of posting a vacancy. There is a cost (in terms of labour) for transporting the Cournot good
internationally. Union formation only occurs in the Cournot sector. In the competitively traded good
sector the good is traded competitively and the revenue labour product function is linear. Therefore
in the absence of a cost of union membership workers in the competitively traded good sector would
be indi￿erent to being a member of a union. As trade union membership is costly, workers would not
wish to join a union.
In presenting the model I shall ￿rst outline the labour market and workers value functions. I
shall then outline the product market, showing how the utility function leads to product demands
and solving the problem of the ￿rm leads to product supply. I then proceed to explain how wages are
bargained. Finally for this section, the equilibrium is outlined.
3.3.1 Labour market
The labour market is characterised by frictional unemployment. This means that if a ￿rm posts
a vacancy this period there is a probability that they shall ￿ll this vacancy and have a worker next
period. It is costly to post a vacancy. A frictional labour market provides a framework in which





i , which gives the total number of matches between unemployed workers
(the mass of workers looking for a job) with vacancies, where ui is the mass of unemployed workers
in country i, vi is simply the total sum of the vacancies posted by the di￿erent ￿rms operating in
country i,  is the labour market match elasticity of unemployment (and 1  is the match elasticity of
vacancies) and s is a parameter that a￿ects the total number of matches between unemployed workers
and vacancies. It should be noted that ui is the mass of unemployed workers and not the rate of
unemployment.
Dividing the total number of vacancies by the number of unemployed workers we get labour
68
O’Farrell, Rory (2010), Globalisation and Labour Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/15663Chapter 3. The E￿ect of International Trade on Trade Union Density




; i = 1;2:::m: (3.1)
Dividing the matching function by vi we get the intensive matching function








If a ￿rm posts a vacancy this period, the probability that it will ￿ll the vacancy this period (and so
have a worker available to work next period) is given by q (i).
3.3.1.1 Workers’ value functions
It is assumed that all agents in the economy are risk neutral. Workers in a country may work
for a ￿rm in the competitively traded good sector or in the Cournot sector. In the Cournot sector
they are paid wages which are either negotiated by a union or by individual bargaining. It is only in
the Cournot sector that workers will join unions. This is as in the competitively traded good sector
￿rms have a linear revenue labour product function and there is no incentive for these workers to join
unions.
Workers do not become members of unions permanently, but each period they choose whether or
not to become a member of a union. If the workers of a ￿rm unionise they all unionise. A closed shop
agreement operates in unionised ￿rms. The Nash equilibrium for whether workers unionise or not can
be that either:
 all ￿rms in the Cournot sector are unionised
 no ￿rm in the Cournot sector is unionised
 or a mixed solution.
The value to a worker of having a job in a unionised ￿rm is denoted as WU
i and the value to a worker of
being employed in a Cournot ￿rm with individual bargaining is denoted as WI
i . Each period Cournot
sector workers face a probability  of being in a union. If WU
i > WI
i then  = 1, if WU
i < WI
i then
 = 0, and if WU
i = WI
i then we have a mixed strategy equilibrium and  2 [0;1]. So workers will
only join a union if the bene￿t of joining is greater than or equal to the cost.
It is useful to describe how the equilibrium level of union density is arrived at. As shown by
Stole and Zwiebel (1996), with imperfect competition (such as Cournot competition) ￿rms in which
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wages are negotiated through individual bargaining will hire more workers than ￿rms where wages
are negotiated through union bargaining. This is as with individual bargaining, ￿rms negotiate with
workers treating each worker as the marginal worker. Firms are aware that if they hire an extra
worker, then this will reduce the marginal revenue product of labour and so reduce the wage for all
other workers in the ￿rm. Firms with individual bargaining have a strategic incentive to hire more
workers than unionised ￿rms. Similarly, when ￿rms face a low probability of becoming unionised they
will hire more workers than when ￿rms face a high probability. Suppose that in the economy the rate
of union density was below its equilibrium value. This would mean more workers are employed per
￿rm than in equilibrium. For a given level of supply of the good, increasing the number of workers for
a ￿rm causes marginal revenue to decrease more than average revenue per worker. As union bargained
wages are a function of average revenue, and individually bargained wages are a function of marginal
revenue, the increase in the di￿erence between marginal revenue and average revenue causes union
membership to be more attractive. Union density will rise, and average level of workers per ￿rm will
fall until equilibrium is achieved.
Di￿erent types of ￿rms may pay di￿erent wages. The value for workers of having a job depends
on the type of ￿rm they are working for. The value to a worker of being employed depends on the
wage they will receive this period, the discounted value of the their state next period, and whether
they face any cost as a result of being a member of a union. The expected value to workers of being
employed in the Cournot sector is
WX
i = WU
i + (1   )WI
i ;
which is the weighted average of being employed in a ￿rm with union bargaining or individual bar-











i is the wage received under union bargaining, U0
i is the value of being unemployed next
period,  is the discount rate,  is the exogenous probability that the worker will separate from the
￿rm at the end of this period, and a is the real cost of being in a trade union. a can be thought of as
union dues or the cost of attending union meetings. The value of unemployment is in nominal terms
so it was necessary to multiply a by the price index P (Xc;Yc). The origin of the index is outlined in
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where wI
i is the wage under individual bargaining. As can be seen the value this period depends on the
discounted probablility of being unemployed next period and the discounted probability of continuing
to work in a Cournot sector ￿rm. The worker does not know if the Cournot sector ￿rm will continue to
bargain wages individually next period or if it will unionise. In the competitively traded good sector











i is the wage in the competitively traded good sector.
If a worker is unemployed he does not participate in the product market. They do gain some
utility, z, which is the income a worker receives from non-market activities. This can be considered
home production which the agent does not sell on the market. The value of unemployment is
Ui = zP (Xic;Yic) +  ((1   iq(i))U0
i + iq(i)E (W 0
i)): (3.3)
iq(i) is the probability that a worker ￿nds a job this period. The value of unemployment is in
nominal terms so it was necessary to multiply z by the price index P (Xic;Yic). As a worker does not
know what type of ￿rm he will work for next, E (W 0
i) is simply a weighted average of the values of













where vi is the total number of vacancies in country i,  vY
i are the total number of vacancies posted in
country i in the Y sector and  vX
i is the total number of vacancies posted by ￿rms in the X sector.
3.3.2 Product market
Two homogeneous goods, X and Y , are produced in the economy. Good Y is the numeraire
competitively traded good and is internationally mobile without any cost of transportation. Due to the
symmetry of the countries good Y will not be traded in equilibrium. The X sector is characterised by
Cournot competition. There are transportation costs if the Cournot good is shipped internationally.
In the Cournot sector a ￿rm negotiates with workers when bargaining wages either individually or
collectively. Labour is used in production in both sectors, however resources are only used in the
competitively traded good sector. It is useful to think of Y as a good which uses the resource land. The




Xic is the total amount of good X consumed in country i, and
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where n is the number of national ￿rms based in each country. Xi;i is the amount of the Cournot
good produced by a country i based national ￿rm for the the market of country i. The ￿rst subscript
index is for the country of origin of the ￿rm, and the second is for where the good is sold. Therefore
Xj;i is the amount of X produced by a country j based ￿rm and exported to country i.
It is assumed that unemployed workers do not participate in the goods market. Using the budget
constraint that national income equals national expenditure, Mi = P (Xic)Xic+Yic; where P (Xic) is





; Yic = (1   )Mi: (3.5)





By de￿nition as numeraire, the price of good Y is equal to 1. The price index for the economy is
de￿ned as
P (Xic;Yic) = P (Xic)
 :
This was calculated by inserting equation (3.5) into the utility function, which gave an indirect utility
function in terms of prices and nominal income, and then rescaling.
3.3.2.1 Competitively traded good sector ￿rms
In the competitively traded good sector ￿rms are small, with one worker per ￿rm. Therefore the
mass of workers, LY
i , and the mass of ￿rms in the competitively traded good sector are identical.
Competitively traded good sector ￿rms consider themselves too small to a￿ect the market. The ￿rms
use resources and one unit of labour. The amount of resources used by an individual ￿rm is given
by ^ Ri. As the resource is freely traded and not subject to any frictions, all the resource will be
used each period, so Ri = LiY ^ Ri . It is free to trade the competitively traded good internationally.
Competitively traded good sector ￿rms only have one worker. There are no competitively traded good
sector MNEs. The value this period of a ￿lled job to an entrepreneur in the competitively traded good
sector is given as
JY
i = yi   wY
i   ri ^ Ri +  (1   )JY 0
i ; (3.7)
where we have the production technology yi = ^ R
1 
i , and ri is the rental rate of resources in country
i, wY
i is the wage and  is the exogenous probability that the job-worker pair will separate. As ￿rms
in this sector are price takers the revenue labour product function is linear. Maximising the above for
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^ Ri and using the fact that all ￿rms in the competitively traded good sector act symmetrically, we get
that

















The value of posting a vacancy in the competitively traded good sector is
V Y
i =  P (Xic;Yic) + (1   )
 
q (i)JY 0




where  is the cost of posting a vacancy and q (i) is the probability that the ￿rm will ￿ll the vacancy.
When a ￿rm decides to post a vacancy they take i as given.  is the exogenous probability that the
￿rm will cease to exist. As a ￿rm is deemed to exist from the moment it posts a vacancy there is a
possibility that the ￿rm will expire before it even manages to hire a worker.
Due to the free entry condition V Y
i  0. In the steady state this holds with equality where there
is a positive number of competitively traded good sector ￿rms operating in country i. Due to the
nature of the Cobb-Douglas production function, in the steady state there will always be a positive





(1   )q (i)
(3.11)
with equality in the steady state if Ri > 0. This is simply the cost of ￿lling a vacancy divided by the
discount factor and probability that the ￿rm will continue to exist next period. Firms have a value
due to the barrier to entry caused by labour market frictions.
3.3.2.2 Cournot sector ￿rms
Good X is a homogeneous good and ￿rms producing good X act according to Cournot compe-
tition, taking the competitively traded good as numeraire. Cournot sector ￿rms are aware of their
e￿ect on the price of X but take the actions of the other ￿rms as given. It is costly for Cournot ￿rms
to enter the market. Firms must pay for a production licence, b, which is paid to some members of the
economy (how it is distributed is irrelevant as agents are risk neutral). There is a cost  associated
with transporting Cournot good internationally. Technology in the Cournot sector is constant returns
to scale. It takes one worker to produce each unit of the good. Firms in the Cournot sector are large
and hire a continuum of workers. As a continuum of workers is hired we can use the law of large
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numbers. Therefore the probability that a worker separates from the ￿rm can be interpreted as the
proportion of workers separating from the ￿rm at the end of the period. Though Cournot sector ￿rms
consider they are large enough to a￿ect the price of the Cournot good, they do not account for any
e￿ect they may have on the labour market, on national income or the price index of the economy as
a whole. Firms in the Cournot sector will negotiate wages according to either union bargaining or
individual bargaining. Firms do not know if next period they will face union bargaining or individual
bargaining. They only know the probability 0 that union bargaining will take place. When ￿rms
become aware that they face union bargaining it may be optimal for them to lay o￿ some workers.
To avoid this complication it is assumed that ￿rms cannot adjust the number of workers downward
until the next period. This is realistic if one assumes that ￿rms must give a minimum notice of one
period before laying o￿ workers.
The timing of activities in the Cournot sector is as follows. Due to labour market frictions the
￿rm must search for workers to ￿ll its vacancies. This is done in the period before they start to work
for the ￿rm. The ￿rm does not know if next period these workers will form a trade union but it does
know the probability that this will happen. If the value of being a member of a union is greater than
the value of bargaining individually then the probability will be one. If the value of joining a union
is less than that of bargaining individually then the value will be zero. If however the value of being
a union member is equal to the value of bargaining individually then the probability will be a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium. If workers form into a union all the workers in the ￿rm join. Workers
have some means, such as a closed shop agreement, to ensure there is no free riding of trade union
membership. Firms have an optimal number of hirings which depends on the probability that workers
will unionise. At the beginning of the next period the workers either unionise or do not. They will
only unionise if the value of trade union membership is greater than or equal to the value of bargaining
individually with the ￿rm. Wage negotiations then follow. If workers bargain individually then during
negotiations the worker can only threaten to withdraw his labour. The ￿rm can treat each worker as
the marginal worker. The ￿rm can threaten to sack the worker and production can continue with the
other workers. However, if workers form into a union then they can threaten to all withdraw their
labour simultaneously. In this case the ￿rm will sack all the workers and no production will take
place this period. The ￿rm does not expire completely however. It has already paid some set up cost
and will not wish to lose the value of this. The ￿rm will post vacancies to hire more workers for the
next period. Assuming wage bargaining has been successful (which in equilibrium it always is) the
￿rm produces the good and decides the level of vacancies to be ￿lled for the next period, taking into
account the probability that next period the workers may form a trade union.
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I will now outline the problem facing Cournot sector ￿rms. The value of a ￿rm in the Cournot
sector is


























; i = 1;2;:::m;




1   e 

Hi + q (i)v; (3.13)
and that production is constrained by the number of workers presently hired by the ￿rm






i (Hi) is the wage if union bargaining takes place and wI
i (Hi) is the wage if wage bargaining
takes place, v is the mass of vacancies posted by the ￿rm, Xi;i is the amount of the Cournot good
supplied by the ￿rm in its home country and Xi;j is the amount of the Cournot good supplied to
country j. At the beginning of the period the ￿rm does not know whether or not a union will form,
it only knows the probability  that a union will form. So the value of a ￿rm at the beginning of the
period is simply the revenue of this period minus the expected wage and cost of posting vacancies plus
the discounted value of the ￿rm next period. The constraint shown in equation (3.14) shows workers
either produce for the home market or are engaged in the production and transport of the good to
the foreign market. The ￿rst order conditions for Xi;i and Xi;j lead to








which is also marginal revenue per worker. Using the ￿rst order conditions, equation (3.4), and the
fact that all countries are symmetric we get the amount that the ￿rms supplies to their domestic
market as
Xi;i =
Hi (1 + n(m   1))





and to each foreign country as
Xi;j =
Hi (1    (n   1))
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Whenever transport costs are positive (and the number of Cournot ￿rms are not less than one) ￿rms
will supply more to their home market than to the market of any other country.
Also, combining the envelope condition and the ￿rst order condition for vacancies we get
















  (1   )

wI












is the marginal revenue gained by hiring one extra worker.
P(Xic;Yic)
q(i) is the









@Hi are the strategic hiring e￿ects. Due to the nature of Cournot
competition, hiring one extra worker will lower the wage for all other workers. As with individual
bargaining the wage is a function of marginal rather than average revenue, the strategic hiring e￿ect
is stronger when a ￿rm faces individual bargaining. As the ￿rm does not know whether a union will
form next period the ￿rm chooses the level of workers such that the cost of hiring workers is equal to
the discounted revenue minus expect wage and expected strategic hiring e￿ect.
It is costly for Cournot sector ￿rms to enter the market. There is a set up cost b. The value of
entering the market is
V (0) = max
v f P (Xic;Yic)v + (1   )V (H0
i)g   bP (Xic;Yic); (3.16)
subject to the law of motion for hiring workers
H0 = q (i)v:
Due to the free entry condition V (0) = 0. From this we can get the steady state value of a ￿rm in





q (i) (1   )
+
bP (Xic;Yic)
 (1   )
:
The ￿rm has a value due to the barrier to entry caused by labour market frictions, and also due to
the cost of a production licence, b.
3.3.3 Wage bargaining
When bargaining wages, workers would like to maximise their surplus of being employed Wk
i  
Ui; k = Y;I;U. Due to the cumbersome nature of the equations, it is useful to substitute out all
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the elements agents take as give during the wage bargain. These are taken as given as agents either
consider themselves too small to a￿ect these variables or can not commit to future variables. Setting
Wk
i = Ui, and rearranging for wages, we get a variable that only includes variables taken as given by
agents. !k
i can be de￿ned as a reservation wage which summarises the labour market e￿ects on the
wage bargain. As wages are renegotiated each period it can be bene￿tial for a worker to accept a low
wage this period in anticipation of bargaining a higher wage next period (though this never happens
in equilibrium). Thus for the competitively traded good sector we de￿ne
!Y
i = zP (Xic;Yic) + 
 
(1   iq(i)   )Ui
0 + iq(i)E (W 0




for X sector ￿rms with individual bargaining as
!I
i = zP (Xic;Yic) + 
 
(1   iq(i)   )Ui
0 + iq(i)E (W 0




and for ￿rms with union bargaining as
!U
i = zP (Xic;Yic) + 
 
(1   iq(i)   )Ui
0 + iq(i)E (W 0




+ aP (Xic;Yic): (3.20)
As can be seen equation (3.17) and equation (3.18) are quite similar. The reservation wage for all
workers is increasing in the value of unemployment and the average wage for the economy. However it
is decreasing in the value of working in the same job next period. This is due to workers being willing
to accept a low wage this period in anticipation of gaining a higher wage next period. The reservation
wage for unionsied workers equation (3.19) is identical to that of workers who bargain individually
with the exception of the term for union dues, aP (Xic;Yic). This is as union members are interested
in their wage net of union dues rather than their gross wage. As there are no frictions in joining a
union unionised workers and workers who bargain their wage individually actually both receive the
same wage net of union dues. From the reservation wage equations it is easy to show that
Wk
i   Ui = wk
i   !k
i ; k = Y;I;U: (3.21)
Using this substitution is useful, though it in no away a￿ects the results of the model.
3.3.3.1 Bargaining in the competitively traded good sector
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where  is the bargaining power of workers. This leads to
JY






















A + (1   )!Y
i : (3.23)
This is simply a weighted average of the production of the worker plus the cost of replacing the worker,
and the reservation wage.
3.3.3.2 Bargaining in Cournot sector ￿rms
Cournot sector ￿rms are large, and bargaining is either conducted by a union representing the
workers or wages are bargained by each worker individually. I will ￿rst outline the case of union
bargaining. If negotiations break down all the workers are sacked, which combined with the free entry
condition, means that the outside option for the ￿rm is zero. The union wishes to maximise the
surplus of the value of employment over unemployment for the members of the union. If negotiations
break down the ￿rm does not shut down completely (then it would lose the money it spent on a set




















=  (V (Hi)   V (0)): (3.24)




P (Xjc)Xi;j, and substituting in equations (3.12) and (3.21)












A + (1   )!U
i : (3.25)
To get the wage net of union dues, this wage equation can be rewritten as
wU










A + (1   )!I
i :















O’Farrell, Rory (2010), Globalisation and Labour Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/15663Chapter 3. The E￿ect of International Trade on Trade Union Density
which is used in the envelope condition for X sector ￿rms.
Calculating wages in the case of individual bargaining is slightly more complicated. During wage
























@Hi appears as non-simultaneous bargaining is used (similar to Stole and Zwiebel, 1996).
If bargaining breaks down and the worker separates from the ￿rm, then the wage is renegotiated with
all the other workers. This term does not appear in the case of union bargaining as if negotiations
break down all the workers separate from the ￿rm, and there are no workers left with which to
renegotiate wages with.






























A + (1   )!I
i :
This wage is a weighted average of the net bene￿t of the match and the reservation wage. The net
bene￿t of the match is the strategic e￿ect of having an extra worker when negotiating wages with the
other workers at the ￿rm, the marginal revenue of the worker, and the cost of replacing the worker.
Solving this di￿erential equation and substitution for @ REVi
@ Hi we get
wI









Mi (Xic   Xi;i)
X2
ic
dHi + P (Xic;Yic)

1   ~ 

q (i)
+ (1   )!I
i :
When we integrate we must remember that Hi has an a￿ect on Xic. We can rewrite Xic as Xic =
(Xic   Xi;i) + Xi;i. Due to the assumptions of Cournot competition, the ￿rm takes (Xic   Xi;i) as
given. Using this, equation (3.14), equation (3.15) and the fact that countries are symmetrical, we can
write








i Mi (Xic   Xi;i)







1   ~ 

q (i)
+ (1   )!I
i :
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In this section the equilibrium is outlined. The model is solved for the steady state. It should be
noted that the model must be solved numerically. In the steady state the number of workers working






jobs must be replaced. As the probability that a ￿rm will ￿ll a vacancy this period is









As nHi + LY
i is simply employment, the level of unemployment is given by










































which is the sum of the competitively traded good produced, and the total output of the Cournot
sector ￿rms in country i. It is assumed that the costs of posting a vacancy are part of the national
income of the country where the ￿rm is located, so there is no need to subtract this from these ￿rms’
revenues in order to calculate national income.
3.4 Results
Due to the heterogeneity of nations in trade blocs a calibration of the model is not appropriate.
Instead a simulation was undertaken, targeting some key variables of the European economies. A
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table of the parameters used is given in Table 3.1. The wages in the model are presented in terms of
the competitively traded good. It must be remembered however that the price of the Cournot good
may vary. In order to make a valid comparison of wages all nominal values have been divided by the
price index P (Xic;Yic). Figure 3.3 helps to summarise the results of the model.
Table 3.1: Parameter values
L R      ~    s z a b
1;000;000 4;500;000 0:5
10000
10033 :5 0:5 :008 :01 :5 :25 :18 0:3 0:15 2;500;000
Figure 3.3: Results: Trade union density for an increasing size of trade bloc.
Comparing Figure 3.3 to Figure 3.1 shows how increasing the number of countries in a trade bloc
can ￿rst increase union density and then it decreases as competition intensi￿es. It should be noted
however that the X axis in Figure 3.1 shows years, while the X axis in Figure 3.3 shows the number
of countries in the trade bloc. For  = :24, with the number of countries in a trade bloc being two
or three, all workers in the Cournot sector are unionised. A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium was
found for the other solutions. For  = :26, with the number of countries in a trade bloc between
two and ￿ve, all workers in the Cournot sector are unionised, and for  = :30, with the number
of countries in a trade bloc between two and ten, all workers in the Cournot sector are unionised.
As can be seen, when a country moves from autarky to trading with one other country there is an
initial jump in union density. This is due to workers moving from producing the Cournot good to
transporting the Cournot good. Due to rent chasing by Cournot ￿rms the output of the Cournot
good actually decreases as workers are diverted to transportation. This causes the di￿erence between
average revenue and marginal revenue to increase, leading to an increase in unionisation. In this
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model trade union density will never reach 100 per cent as there is never an incentive for workers in
the one worker per ￿rm competitively traded good sector to join a union. As the number of countries
in the trade bloc increases the increase in competition leads to a fall in the di￿erence between average
revenue and marginal revenue for Cournot ￿rms. This causes a decrease in union density. As the
number of countries goes to in￿nity the marginal e￿ect of an increase in the size of the trade bloc on
union density goes to zero. Transport costs have an e￿ect on union density. It would be expected
that higher transport costs protect ￿rms from international competition, which leads to higher union
density, and this has been found to be the case. The continuing increase in density after moving from
autarky to more countries in the trade bloc is due to increased employment by Cournot ￿rms of both
transport and production workers.
Figure 3.4: Results: Trade union premium for an increasing size of trade bloc
As can be seen from Figure 3.4 the wage premium has remained largely stable, though it has
decreased slightly. The value of the wage premium is within the range of estimates in the literature.
The value of the wage premium is determined largely by the cost of union membership, a. The
decrease is due to the di￿ering fortunes of ￿rms in the Cournot sector and competitively traded good
sector. Though the di￿erence between union wages and non-union wages in the Cournot sector is
constant, the increase in competition a￿ects the Cournot sector more than the competitively traded
good sector. This leads to a small relative improvement to wages in the competitively traded good
sector, and it is this which causes the small decline in the union wage premium.
The model also explains why the direction of union wages need not be linked to the direction of
union density. Comparing Figure 3.5 with Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 shows how the union real wage
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can move in the opposite direction to union density and the union wage premium. When there is a
low number of countries in the trade bloc the real wage falls. This is as workers are being diverted to
transporting the Cournot good rather than producing the Cournot good, causing the price to rise. This
lowers the real wage. As more countries join the trade bloc the e￿ect of greater competition dominates
over the e￿ect of diverting workers to transporting the good. The real wage is increasing due to a
decline in markups in the Cournot sector as competition causes the average revenue and marginal
revenue of ￿rms to converge. However this same convergence of average and marginal revenue is what
causes the decline in trade union density.
As can be seen from Figure 3.6 the model also partially replicates the rise and fall of the labour
share of income as seen in the data (European Communities, 2007). This rise and decline coincides
with the movements in trade union density. Also, diverting workers from the competitively traded
sector increases the resource labour ratio, which serves to lower the share of income that goes to the
owner of the resource. Though the model matches the data qualitatively it can account only partially
for the decrease in the labour share of income. This is only to be expected from the model that
does not include capital as a factor of production. Finally, the simulated results for unemployment
are shown in Figure 3.7. It is found that increasing international openness leads to an decrease in
unemployment. This is partially due to employers being willing to employ more workers if there is
a smaller probability of workers forming a union. This model does not capture the unemployment
dynamics of the European economics. This is due to the model being solved for the steady state. Any
unemployment caused by the economy moving from one steady state to another is not captured.
3.5 Conclusion
Given the international decline in trade union density, it is possible that the cause of the decline is
increasing internationalisation. In this paper, international product market competition is put forward
as a cause for the decrease in union density. This is as the narrowing of the di￿erence between average
revenue and marginal revenue which is caused by increased competition reduces the advantage of
being a trade union member, as trade union wages are a function of average revenue. It is found
that increasing the number of countries in a trade bloc initially increases but then decreases the
level of trade union density. This initial increase is caused by rent seeking ￿rms transferring workers
to transporting rather than producing the good, causing an initial fall in production, and therefore
competition, of the good. It is also found that movements in the union wage can be in the opposite
direction to trade union density and the trade union wage premium.
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Figure 3.5: Results: Real wage of trade union members for an increasing size of trade bloc.
Figure 3.6: Results: Labour share of income for an increasing size of trade bloc.
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Figure 3.7: Results: Unemployment rate for an increasing size of trade bloc.
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A.1 Outside option of MNE when negotiating with workers in
the foreign plant
In this appendix I show how the outside option of a MNE is calculated when negotiating with
workers in its foreign plant. If bargaining breaks down in the foreign plant the ￿rm only produces in
the home plant. The value function of a MNE that is temporarily only producing in one country is
very similar to the value function of a national ￿rm, with the exception that vacancies will be posted
for the plants in both countries. By assumption a MNE can not decide to operate as a national ￿rm.
A hat over a variable signi￿es its value if negotiations break down with workers in the foreign plant.
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Similar to the case of the national ￿rm we can get d REV M











































It is also useful at this point to show
































which is positive if the ￿rm is not operating as a monopoly, and




























h = P (Xc)XM
h + P (X
c)XM
h . This is simply the marginal value of the foreign plant
plus the value of not needing to replace the workers in the foreign plant, minus the wage bill of the
foreign plant. The ￿rst order condition of equation (2.29) leads to
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A.2 Outside option of MNE when negotiating with workers in
the home plant
In this appendix I show how the outside option of a MNE is calculated when negotiating with
workers in its home plant. A tilde over a variable signi￿es its value if negotiations break down with
workers in the home plant. The value of the ￿rm if negotiations break down with workers in the home
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h = F + G + XM
h + (1 + 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h :
Special note should be taken of the ￿nal constraint. It is necessary for the ￿rm to perform its
headquarter functions in the foreign country. This means there will be F less workers to produce, so
if F is very large then the outside option of the multinational may actually be negative. However, in
the simulation conducted in this paper HM
h > F + G. As wages are bargained simultaneously the
￿rm cannot simply refuse to pay these wages if its outside option is negative. The revenue of the ￿rm













Case a If HM
h  F + G, g REV M
h = 0,










Case b If HM
h > F + G the ￿rm can operate this period similarly to a national ￿rm. Similar
to the situation of negotiating wages in the foreign plant due to Cournot competition the ￿rm assumes
that other ￿rms will not react to changes in its production, so
e X




The ￿rst order conditions for e XM












































It is also useful to note
































which is strictly positive, and
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In this appendix I show the value of wages in the steady state. It is not possible to get analytical
solutions. Using the wage equations and equations (2.2), (2.24),and (2.34), and solving for the steady





































































































































































































In this appendix I explain why exogenous ￿rm exit is assumed. To see why exogenous ￿rm
exit is necessary it is worthwhile making the distinction between job separation and ￿rm exit. In the
most simple of frictional labour market models there is one job per ￿rm, and worker job separation
is exogenous. In the simple model, (which is similar to how competitively traded good sector ￿rms
behave in my model) ￿rm exit and separation of a job-worker pair are equivalent, as when there is
only one worker per ￿rm both scenarios amount to the end of the ￿rm and the end of the job-worker
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pair. When ￿rms have more than one worker this is no longer the case. If a ￿rm exits, then all the
workers separate from the ￿rm (as in the simple model). However, if a single worker separates from
the ￿rm, this does not mean the end of the ￿rm as there are other workers still employed by the ￿rm.
In this model the probability that a ￿rm exits is , and the probability that a worker separates from
the ￿rm is e . As stated before, the probability that a worker who has a job will still have it the next
period is given by (1   ). So (1   ) = (1   )

1   e 

, or  =  + e    e . Ebell and Haefke (2006)
justify including ￿rm exit for quantitative reasons, in order that the rate of ￿rm exit in their model is
more similar to that seen in the data. I use it for di￿erent reasons.
Exogenous ￿rm exit is necessary to prevent an in￿nite number of solutions to the model. I will
provide an example to show why this is the case. Imagine an economy where ￿rms are large (that is,
there is more than one worker per ￿rm), ￿rms are in￿nitely lived, and there are labour market matching
frictions. Due to the free entry condition, the value of opening a ￿rm (which has no employees as it
must ￿rst post vacancies) is less than or equal to zero, which can be written as V (0)  0. Firms will
wish to continue to exist if they have a positive value, so we can write a free exit condition for ￿rms
that are operating normally and have employees working in the ￿rm as V (H)  0. The value of an
operating ￿rm should be higher than the value of a new entrant as the operating ￿rm has the value
of ￿lled vacancies, so V (H)  V (0). We denote the number of ￿rms in the economy as k. We can
assume that the value of establishing a new ￿rm, and the value of an operating ￿rm is decreasing in k,
so
@V (0)
@k  0; and
@V (H)
@k  0. This is plausible as increasing the number of ￿rms will increase product
market competition, and so decrease the value of both operating ￿rms and new ￿rms. Denote the
value of k such that V (0) = 0 as k0 and the value of k such that V (H) = 0 as k1. At k0 there is no
incentive for any new ￿rms to enter, and at k1 there is no incentive for ￿rms to exit. As V (H)  V (0)
and as the value of ￿rms decreases with k any value of k 2 [k0;k1] will be a Nash equilibrium, as no
￿rm will wish to enter or leave the market and there will be no deviations. There will be an in￿nite
number of solutions.
However, if we impose the assumption that ￿rms exit with the exogenous probability  2 (0;1]
then if k > k0 over time the number of ￿rms will be reduced to k0. In the steady state the only
solution to the number of ￿rms will be k0. It will be maintained at this level by the entry of new ￿rms
each period.
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A.5 Timing for vacancies
In this appendix I explain how vacancies are dealt with in a situation of large ￿rms and exogenous
￿rm exit. The question arises, if some ￿rms exit at the end of the period, what happens to the vacancies
they posted this period? It is best to consider the timing as follows. Firms decide the number of
vacancies they wish to post at the beginning of the period and pay a posting cost to some form of jobs
agency. In the middle of the period the ￿rm carries out its function of producing and selling. Near
the end of the period some ￿rms exit. The vacancies they posted are withdrawn from the market. At
the very end of the period the match is made between unemployed workers and vacancies posted by
surviving ￿rms. As agents are aware that at the end of each period some ￿rms will be destroyed they
can anticipate the number of vacancies that will be there when labour market matching takes place.
All vacancies mentioned in the model of this paper refer to the surviving vacancies available at the
end of the period.
In this model ￿rms are deemed to exist from the ￿rst period that they post a vacancy. The
dynamics of ￿rms in the steady state is as follows. Dealing ￿rst with competitively traded good sector
￿rms, at the beginning of the period there are LY competitively traded good sector ￿rms in operation.
Agents anticipate that  of these will exit at the beginning of the period due to either the worker
separating from the ￿rm, the ￿rm exiting, or both. During the period a total of L
Y
(1 )q() vacancies
are posted by new ￿rms. However, as  of these new ￿rms are destroyed at the end of the period we
are left with L
Y
q() vacancies for jobs in the competitively traded sector at the end of the period.
For Cournot sector ￿rms again the proportion  of jobs are destroyed at the end of the period.
Suppose there are k of each ￿rm type, where k = m;n. There will be
k
(1 ) new ￿rms enter at the
beginning of the period. When new ￿rms enter they have no employees. As was shown in the paper,
next period new ￿rms will have the same number of workers as the established ￿rms, so they must
post H
q() vacancies. As ￿rms that are established already have some workers, they need only post
e H
q()
to maintain the optimal number of employees. So in total
kH
(1 )q() + ke H
q() vacancies are posted, of
which only the fraction (1   ) become e￿ective. So, at the end of the period there are kH
q() vacancies
for each type of job in the Cournot sector.
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